1
00:00:45,920 --> 00:00:48,088
"Laura, at this stage,
2
00:00:48,173 --> 00:00:50,924
I can offer nothing more
than my word.
3
00:00:51,009 --> 00:00:54,803
I am a senior government employee
in the intelligence community.
4
00:00:54,888 --> 00:00:58,140
I hope you understand that
contacting you is extremely high risk
5
00:00:58,224 --> 00:01:00,517
and you are willing to agree
to the following precautions
6
00:01:00,602 --> 00:01:02,686
before I share more.
7
00:01:02,771 --> 00:01:04,730
This will not be a waste of your time.
8
00:01:05,899 --> 00:01:07,441
The following sounds complex
9
00:01:07,525 --> 00:01:11,278
but should only take minutes
to complete for someone technical.
10
00:01:11,362 --> 00:01:13,155
I would like to confirm out of email
11
00:01:13,239 --> 00:01:15,282
that the keys we exchanged
were not intercepted
12
00:01:15,366 --> 00:01:18,744
and replaced by your surveillance.
13
00:01:18,828 --> 00:01:21,997
Please confirm that no one has
ever had a copy of your private key
14
00:01:22,082 --> 00:01:23,999
and that it uses a strong passphrase.
15
00:01:24,084 --> 00:01:27,878
Assume your adversary is capable
of one trillion guesses per second.
16
00:01:28,880 --> 00:01:30,923
If the device you store
the private key
17
00:01:31,007 --> 00:01:33,592
and enter your passphrase on
has been hacked,
18
00:01:33,676 --> 00:01:36,261
it is trivial
to decrypt our communications.
19
00:01:37,263 --> 00:01:39,932
Understand that the above steps
are not bulletproof
20
00:01:40,016 --> 00:01:42,184
and are intended only
to give us breathing room.
21
00:01:42,268 --> 00:01:44,436
In the end, if you publish
the source material,
22
00:01:44,521 --> 00:01:46,605
I will likely be immediately implicated.
23
00:01:46,689 --> 00:01:50,192
This must not deter you from releasing
the information I will provide.
24
00:01:51,778 --> 00:01:53,654
Thank you, and be careful.
25
00:01:54,781 --> 00:01:56,490
Citizenfour."
26
00:02:18,805 --> 00:02:22,224
Bottom line is...
surveillance means
27
00:02:22,308 --> 00:02:25,477
that there are facts
that we no longer abide to.
28
00:02:25,562 --> 00:02:27,062
If you take away the surveillance,
29
00:02:27,147 --> 00:02:29,481
there are no facts that
the government can manufacture.
30
00:02:29,566 --> 00:02:32,734
Ah, that's right, and this is all
about creating an independent record.
31
00:02:32,819 --> 00:02:36,864
To me, this goes to the question
32
00:02:36,948 --> 00:02:40,617
of independently verifying
what the government is doing.
33
00:02:40,702 --> 00:02:43,412
That's why I keep going
back to that question.
34
00:02:43,496 --> 00:02:47,249
More with David Sirota
after CBS news,
35
00:02:47,333 --> 00:02:51,712
traffic, and weather
on KKZN Denver/Boulder, AM 7...
36
00:02:57,218 --> 00:02:59,344
Hey, can you hear me?
37
00:02:59,429 --> 00:03:01,096
I am here, David, how are you?
38
00:03:05,602 --> 00:03:07,644
Well I would just point...
start by pointing to
39
00:03:07,729 --> 00:03:10,147
what Barack Obama himself
said about those questions
40
00:03:10,231 --> 00:03:13,108
when he was running for the office
that he now occupies.
41
00:03:13,193 --> 00:03:15,277
In December of 2007,
he said, quote,
42
00:03:15,361 --> 00:03:18,864
"The president does not have
the power under the Constitution
43
00:03:18,948 --> 00:03:20,908
to unilaterally
authorize a military attack
44
00:03:20,992 --> 00:03:23,660
in a situation
that does not involve stopping
45
00:03:23,745 --> 00:03:25,454
an actual or imminent threat
to the nation."
46
00:03:25,538 --> 00:03:28,790
So by Obama's own words,
the president does not have the power
47
00:03:28,875 --> 00:03:31,293
that he is now exercising
under the Constitution.
48
00:03:31,377 --> 00:03:35,047
And as far as why it matters,
in... on August 1, 2007,
49
00:03:35,131 --> 00:03:38,800
when he laid out his reasons
why he was running for office
50
00:03:38,885 --> 00:03:41,678
and why he thought it was so important
to change the way we were doing things,
51
00:03:41,763 --> 00:03:45,557
he said, quote, "No more ignoring
the law when it's inconvenient.
52
00:03:45,642 --> 00:03:47,309
That is not who we are.
53
00:03:47,393 --> 00:03:49,436
We will again
set an example for the world
54
00:03:49,520 --> 00:03:52,522
that the law is not subject
to the whims of stubborn rulers."
55
00:04:21,678 --> 00:04:24,221
You asked why I picked you.
56
00:04:24,305 --> 00:04:26,974
I didn't. You did.
57
00:04:27,058 --> 00:04:30,060
The surveillance you've experienced
means you've been "selected,"
58
00:04:30,144 --> 00:04:32,312
a term which will mean
more to you as you learn about
59
00:04:32,397 --> 00:04:35,190
how the modern
SIGINT system works.
60
00:04:36,442 --> 00:04:38,860
For now, know that
every border you cross,
61
00:04:38,945 --> 00:04:41,989
every purchase you make,
every call you dial,
62
00:04:42,073 --> 00:04:45,242
every cell phone tower you pass,
friend you keep,
63
00:04:45,326 --> 00:04:49,079
article you write, site you visit,
subject line you type,
64
00:04:49,163 --> 00:04:51,999
and packet you route
is in the hands of a system
65
00:04:52,083 --> 00:04:55,210
whose reach is unlimited,
but whose safeguards are not.
66
00:04:56,838 --> 00:04:58,755
Your victimization
by the NSA system
67
00:04:58,840 --> 00:05:00,507
means that you are
well aware of the threat
68
00:05:00,591 --> 00:05:04,845
that unrestricted secret police
pose for democracies.
69
00:05:04,929 --> 00:05:07,139
This is a story few
but you can tell.
70
00:06:01,694 --> 00:06:03,695
Thank you for inviting me here
71
00:06:03,780 --> 00:06:07,824
to give me the opportunity
to express my story.
72
00:06:07,909 --> 00:06:09,951
Let me give you
some of my background.
73
00:06:10,036 --> 00:06:13,080
I spent about four years in the military,
and then I went into NSA.
74
00:06:13,164 --> 00:06:15,082
Directly, so...
75
00:06:15,166 --> 00:06:19,211
So I ended up with about
37 years of service combined.
76
00:06:19,295 --> 00:06:21,171
Most of it was a lot of fun,
I tell you,
77
00:06:21,255 --> 00:06:23,215
it was really a lot of fun,
breaking these puzzles you know,
78
00:06:23,299 --> 00:06:25,842
solving problems
and things like that.
79
00:06:25,927 --> 00:06:28,970
And that's really what I did,
I fundamentally started working with data,
80
00:06:29,055 --> 00:06:31,223
looking at data and data systems
and how you do that.
81
00:06:31,307 --> 00:06:35,185
I was developing
this concept of analysis
82
00:06:35,269 --> 00:06:37,104
that you could lay it out
in such a way
83
00:06:37,188 --> 00:06:39,731
that it could be coded
and executed electronically.
84
00:06:39,816 --> 00:06:42,234
Meaning you could automate analysis.
85
00:06:42,318 --> 00:06:45,904
And it has to do with metadata
and using metadata relationships.
86
00:06:45,988 --> 00:06:48,990
So that was the whole,
that was my whole theme there at NSA.
87
00:06:49,075 --> 00:06:50,742
That was eventually,
that's what I ended up to.
88
00:06:50,827 --> 00:06:53,328
I was the only one there
doing that, by the way.
89
00:06:53,413 --> 00:06:55,956
So any rate, 9/11 happened,
90
00:06:56,040 --> 00:07:00,877
and it must have been
right after, a few days,
91
00:07:00,962 --> 00:07:03,004
no more than a week after 9/11
92
00:07:03,089 --> 00:07:08,844
that they decided to begin actively
spying on everyone in this country.
93
00:07:08,928 --> 00:07:10,846
And they wanted the back part
94
00:07:10,930 --> 00:07:13,890
of our program
to run all of the spying.
95
00:07:13,975 --> 00:07:18,353
All right?
So, that's exactly what they did.
96
00:07:18,438 --> 00:07:20,397
And then they started
taking the telecom data
97
00:07:20,481 --> 00:07:21,982
and expanded after that.
98
00:07:22,066 --> 00:07:25,485
I mean the one I knew was
AT&T,
99
00:07:25,570 --> 00:07:28,947
and that one provided
320 million records every day.
100
00:07:29,031 --> 00:07:32,409
That program was reauthorized
every 45 days
101
00:07:32,493 --> 00:07:34,911
by what I call
the "yes committee,"
102
00:07:34,996 --> 00:07:39,207
which was Hayden
and Tenet and the DOJ.
103
00:07:39,292 --> 00:07:41,960
The program was called
Stellar Wind.
104
00:07:42,044 --> 00:07:44,880
So first I went to
the House Intelligence Committee
105
00:07:44,964 --> 00:07:46,798
and the staff member
that I personally knew there,
106
00:07:46,883 --> 00:07:50,343
and she then went to
the chairman of the committee,
107
00:07:50,428 --> 00:07:52,554
Nancy Pelosi
was the minority rep.
108
00:07:53,931 --> 00:07:55,599
They were all briefed
into the program
109
00:07:55,683 --> 00:07:57,350
at the time, by the way,
110
00:07:57,435 --> 00:07:59,102
and all the other programs
that were going on,
111
00:07:59,187 --> 00:08:01,730
including
all these CIA programs.
112
00:08:01,814 --> 00:08:04,774
I wasn't alone in this.
There were four others out of NSA,
113
00:08:04,859 --> 00:08:06,485
and we were all
trying to work internally
114
00:08:06,569 --> 00:08:08,069
in the government
over these years
115
00:08:08,154 --> 00:08:10,238
trying to get them
to come around
116
00:08:10,323 --> 00:08:11,948
to being
constitutionally acceptable
117
00:08:12,033 --> 00:08:13,492
and take it into the courts
118
00:08:13,576 --> 00:08:15,660
and have the courts'
oversight of it too.
119
00:08:15,745 --> 00:08:17,704
So we, we naively kept thinking
120
00:08:17,788 --> 00:08:20,624
that could, uh,
that could happen.
121
00:08:20,708 --> 00:08:22,834
And it never did.
122
00:08:23,961 --> 00:08:25,504
But any rate, after that,
123
00:08:25,588 --> 00:08:29,007
and all the stuff we were doing
they decided to raid us,
124
00:08:29,091 --> 00:08:31,384
to keep us quiet,
threaten us, you know.
125
00:08:31,469 --> 00:08:34,429
So we were raided
simultaneously, four of us.
126
00:08:34,514 --> 00:08:36,473
In my case,
they came in with guns drawn.
127
00:08:36,557 --> 00:08:39,643
I don't know why they did that,
but they did, so...
128
00:08:59,121 --> 00:09:01,289
Laura, I will answer
129
00:09:01,374 --> 00:09:03,875
what I remember of your questions
as best I can.
130
00:09:03,960 --> 00:09:05,418
Forgive the lack of structure.
131
00:09:05,503 --> 00:09:09,130
I am not a writer, and I have
to draft this in a great hurry.
132
00:09:10,508 --> 00:09:14,010
What you know
as Stellar Wind has grown.
133
00:09:14,095 --> 00:09:17,389
SSO, the expanded
Special Source Operations
134
00:09:17,473 --> 00:09:19,891
that took over Stellar Wind's
share of the pie,
135
00:09:19,976 --> 00:09:22,894
has spread all over the world
to practically include
136
00:09:22,979 --> 00:09:25,355
comprehensive coverage
of the United States.
137
00:09:26,274 --> 00:09:29,150
Disturbingly,
the amount of US communication
138
00:09:29,235 --> 00:09:32,696
ingested by NSA is still increasing.
139
00:09:32,780 --> 00:09:35,407
Publicly, we complain that
things are going dark,
140
00:09:35,491 --> 00:09:38,660
but in fact,
our accesses are improving.
141
00:09:38,744 --> 00:09:41,580
The truth is that the NSA
has never in its history
142
00:09:41,664 --> 00:09:44,207
collected more than it does now.
143
00:09:46,043 --> 00:09:49,337
I know the location of most
domestic interception points
144
00:09:49,422 --> 00:09:52,716
and that the largest
telecommunication companies in the US
145
00:09:52,800 --> 00:09:54,718
are betraying
the trust of their customers,
146
00:09:54,802 --> 00:09:57,178
which I can prove.
147
00:09:57,263 --> 00:09:59,347
We are building the greatest
weapon for oppression
148
00:09:59,432 --> 00:10:00,932
in the history of man,
149
00:10:01,017 --> 00:10:04,311
yet its directors exempt themselves
from accountability.
150
00:10:05,688 --> 00:10:08,982
NSA director Keith Alexander
lied to Congress,
151
00:10:09,066 --> 00:10:11,568
which I can prove.
152
00:10:11,652 --> 00:10:15,196
Billions of US communications
are being intercepted.
153
00:10:16,449 --> 00:10:18,074
In gathering
evidence of wrongdoing,
154
00:10:18,159 --> 00:10:20,452
I focused on the wronging
of the American people,
155
00:10:20,536 --> 00:10:21,953
but believe me when I say that
156
00:10:22,038 --> 00:10:24,623
the surveillance we live under
is the highest privilege
157
00:10:24,707 --> 00:10:27,751
compared to how we treat
the rest of the world.
158
00:10:27,835 --> 00:10:29,628
This I can also prove.
159
00:10:30,838 --> 00:10:33,632
On cyber operations,
the government's public position
160
00:10:33,716 --> 00:10:36,009
is that we still lack a policy framework.
161
00:10:36,093 --> 00:10:37,594
This too is a lie.
162
00:10:37,678 --> 00:10:39,846
There is a detailed
policy framework,
163
00:10:39,930 --> 00:10:42,265
a kind of Marshall Law
for cyber operations
164
00:10:42,350 --> 00:10:44,142
created by the White House.
165
00:10:44,226 --> 00:10:46,478
It's called Presidential
Policy Directive 20
166
00:10:46,562 --> 00:10:49,397
and was finalized
at the end of last year.
167
00:10:49,482 --> 00:10:52,150
This I can also prove.
168
00:10:52,234 --> 00:10:54,653
I appreciate
your concern for my safety,
169
00:10:54,737 --> 00:10:56,988
but I already know
how this will end for me,
170
00:10:57,073 --> 00:10:59,115
and I accept the risk.
171
00:10:59,200 --> 00:11:01,743
If I have luck
and you are careful,
172
00:11:01,827 --> 00:11:03,787
you will have
everything you need.
173
00:11:03,871 --> 00:11:06,039
I ask only that
you ensure this information
174
00:11:06,123 --> 00:11:09,084
makes it home
to the American public.
175
00:11:09,168 --> 00:11:14,089
Does the NSA routinely intercept
American citizens' emails?
176
00:11:14,173 --> 00:11:15,548
No.
177
00:11:17,259 --> 00:11:23,098
Does the NSA intercept Americans'
cell phone conversations?
178
00:11:23,182 --> 00:11:24,182
No.
179
00:11:24,266 --> 00:11:26,851
- Google searches?
- No.
180
00:11:26,936 --> 00:11:29,354
- Text messages?
- No.
181
00:11:29,438 --> 00:11:32,357
- Amazon.com orders?
- No.
182
00:11:32,441 --> 00:11:34,234
- Bank records?
- No.
183
00:11:34,318 --> 00:11:37,904
What judicial consent
is required for NSA
184
00:11:37,988 --> 00:11:40,281
to intercept communications...
185
00:11:41,283 --> 00:11:44,327
and information
involving American citizens?
186
00:11:44,412 --> 00:11:47,330
Within the United States,
that would be the FBI lead.
187
00:11:47,415 --> 00:11:49,457
If it was a foreign actor
in the United States,
188
00:11:49,542 --> 00:11:52,210
the FBI would still have the lead
and could work that with...
189
00:11:52,294 --> 00:11:56,339
with NSA or other intelligence
agencies as authorized.
190
00:11:56,424 --> 00:11:57,924
But to conduct that kind of...
191
00:11:59,176 --> 00:12:02,929
of collection in the United States,
it would have to go through a court order,
192
00:12:03,013 --> 00:12:04,973
and the court
would have to authorize it.
193
00:12:05,057 --> 00:12:07,809
We are not authorized to do it,
nor do we do it.
194
00:12:15,943 --> 00:12:18,069
All rise.
195
00:12:18,154 --> 00:12:19,738
The United States
Court of Appeals
196
00:12:19,822 --> 00:12:22,991
for the Ninth Circuit
is now in session.
197
00:12:23,075 --> 00:12:24,451
Please be seated.
198
00:12:33,169 --> 00:12:36,087
Good morning, and welcome
to the Ninth Circuit.
199
00:12:37,173 --> 00:12:39,132
The first case for argument is
200
00:12:39,216 --> 00:12:42,218
Jewel versus
National Security Agency.
201
00:12:42,303 --> 00:12:43,845
You may proceed.
202
00:12:46,640 --> 00:12:48,975
May it please the court,
Kevin Bankston,
203
00:12:49,059 --> 00:12:51,102
for Carolyn Jewel and her fellow
plaintiff appellants
204
00:12:51,187 --> 00:12:53,146
in Jewel v. NSA.
205
00:12:53,230 --> 00:12:57,066
Your Honors, plaintiffs
have specifically alleged
206
00:12:57,151 --> 00:12:59,903
that their own communications
and communications records
207
00:12:59,987 --> 00:13:01,404
have been acquired
by the government.
208
00:13:01,489 --> 00:13:03,823
But the District Court
found that
209
00:13:03,908 --> 00:13:05,909
we had failed to allege facts
210
00:13:05,993 --> 00:13:08,870
that differentiated the injury
that our plaintiffs suffered
211
00:13:08,954 --> 00:13:12,582
from the injuries suffered
by every otherAT&T user
212
00:13:12,666 --> 00:13:15,293
whose communications and records
have been acquired by the government,
213
00:13:15,377 --> 00:13:19,172
basically concluding that
so long as everyone is being surveilled,
214
00:13:19,256 --> 00:13:21,424
no one has standing to sue.
215
00:13:21,509 --> 00:13:23,301
However,
to deny standing to persons
216
00:13:23,385 --> 00:13:26,554
who are injured simply because
many others are also injured
217
00:13:26,639 --> 00:13:29,182
would mean that the most injurious
and widespread government actions
218
00:13:29,266 --> 00:13:30,892
could be questioned by nobody.
219
00:13:30,976 --> 00:13:33,269
Do you have
anything concrete that in fact
220
00:13:33,354 --> 00:13:39,067
a specific communication
of your client was intercepted?
221
00:13:39,151 --> 00:13:41,528
We have evidence
that all the communications
222
00:13:41,612 --> 00:13:45,073
passing between AT&T's network
and other networks
223
00:13:45,157 --> 00:13:48,117
in their Northern California
facility have been intercepted.
224
00:13:48,202 --> 00:13:51,120
And so that would necessarily include
the Internet communications
225
00:13:51,205 --> 00:13:53,665
of our Northern California
plaintiffs.
226
00:13:53,749 --> 00:13:55,500
Okay, thank you.
227
00:13:55,584 --> 00:13:56,960
Thank you, Your Honors.
228
00:14:03,968 --> 00:14:07,011
May it please the court, I am Thomas Byron
from the Department of Justice
229
00:14:07,096 --> 00:14:09,097
here on behalf
of the government defendants.
230
00:14:09,181 --> 00:14:13,977
We think this litigation
need not be resolved in federal court
231
00:14:14,061 --> 00:14:17,146
in light of the oversight
of the political branches,
232
00:14:17,231 --> 00:14:19,607
both legislative and executive,
233
00:14:19,692 --> 00:14:23,403
which provides
a better opportunity
234
00:14:23,487 --> 00:14:26,781
for oversight and resolution
of the concerns raised
235
00:14:26,866 --> 00:14:31,369
concerning nationwide policies
of alleged surveillance,
236
00:14:31,453 --> 00:14:33,246
uh, in these complaints.
237
00:14:33,330 --> 00:14:36,416
Even if it's revealed that
one or more of the plaintiffs
238
00:14:36,500 --> 00:14:39,794
had email or telephone
conversations intercepted
239
00:14:39,879 --> 00:14:42,922
that had nothing to do
with national security?
240
00:14:43,007 --> 00:14:45,300
Your Honor, I don't know
that anyone necessarily
241
00:14:45,384 --> 00:14:46,926
would have standing to raise
242
00:14:47,011 --> 00:14:49,971
the particular claims at issue
in these two cases.
243
00:14:50,055 --> 00:14:54,309
We think instead that the kinds
of claims at issue here
244
00:14:54,393 --> 00:14:56,394
against these defendants
245
00:14:56,478 --> 00:14:59,063
are those that are better suited
to resolution
246
00:14:59,148 --> 00:15:01,816
before the... the representative
branches of our government.
247
00:15:01,901 --> 00:15:05,653
So what role
would the judiciary have
248
00:15:05,738 --> 00:15:09,198
if your approach is adopted?
249
00:15:09,283 --> 00:15:10,825
Judge Pregerson,
I think that...
250
00:15:10,910 --> 00:15:14,203
I mean, we just
get out of the way, is that it?
251
00:15:14,288 --> 00:15:16,956
Well, Judge Pregerson, I think
that there is a narrow category,
252
00:15:17,041 --> 00:15:22,337
a subset of cases, in which
it may be appropriate to step aside
253
00:15:22,421 --> 00:15:24,422
for that narrow category of cases.
254
00:15:24,506 --> 00:15:27,508
But the judiciary plays a role...
255
00:15:27,593 --> 00:15:28,968
To be sure, Judge Pregerson...
256
00:15:29,053 --> 00:15:31,721
- ...in our system.
- Yes, Your Honor.
257
00:15:31,805 --> 00:15:33,473
And we don't mean
to diminish that.
258
00:15:33,557 --> 00:15:36,601
You know, you're asking us
to abdicate that role.
259
00:15:36,685 --> 00:15:40,104
No, Your Honor, um, but it is
a question of this court's discretion
260
00:15:40,189 --> 00:15:41,940
whether to reach that issue.
261
00:15:42,024 --> 00:15:44,067
We do think that
there is simply no way
262
00:15:44,151 --> 00:15:47,111
for the litigation to proceed
without risk of divulging
263
00:15:47,196 --> 00:15:51,741
those very questions of privileged
information that would cause,
264
00:15:51,825 --> 00:15:54,077
as the Director of National
Intelligence has explained,
265
00:15:54,161 --> 00:15:55,578
exceptionally grave damage
266
00:15:55,663 --> 00:15:58,748
to national security
if disclosed.
267
00:16:01,835 --> 00:16:03,211
Um, thanks for having me.
268
00:16:04,463 --> 00:16:07,590
If anybody has any questions, like I said,
basically just raise your hand
269
00:16:07,675 --> 00:16:10,468
and I'll try to call on you
as soon as I possibly can.
270
00:16:10,552 --> 00:16:13,096
So who here actually feels like
271
00:16:13,180 --> 00:16:16,099
they are under surveillance
pretty regularly?
272
00:16:17,184 --> 00:16:19,727
Everyone inside of Occupy.
273
00:16:19,812 --> 00:16:22,021
How many people have been
arrested and had their,
274
00:16:22,106 --> 00:16:24,649
at their court date, they had
their phone taken into the back room?
275
00:16:24,733 --> 00:16:28,069
How many people in here
had their retina scanned?
276
00:16:28,153 --> 00:16:29,445
Wow.
277
00:16:29,530 --> 00:16:33,783
Um, so you guys are actually in a sense
the canaries in the coal mine.
278
00:16:33,867 --> 00:16:36,577
Right, because the incentives
are all lined up against you.
279
00:16:36,662 --> 00:16:38,371
Anybody see on the subway,
280
00:16:38,455 --> 00:16:41,290
"Link your MetroCard
to your debit card," right?
281
00:16:41,375 --> 00:16:42,667
Like, auto-refill?
282
00:16:42,751 --> 00:16:45,253
This is a concept which is key
to everything we'll talk about today.
283
00:16:45,337 --> 00:16:46,754
And it's called linkability:
284
00:16:46,839 --> 00:16:50,258
Take one piece of data and link it
to another piece of data.
285
00:16:50,342 --> 00:16:52,385
So, for example,
if you have your MetroCard
286
00:16:52,469 --> 00:16:54,429
and you have your debit card,
you have those things
287
00:16:54,513 --> 00:16:56,431
and you can draw a line
between them, right?
288
00:16:56,515 --> 00:17:00,143
So that's, like, not a scary thing,
except your bank card is tied
289
00:17:00,227 --> 00:17:02,270
to everything else that you do
during the day.
290
00:17:02,354 --> 00:17:05,690
So now they know where you're going,
when you make purchases.
291
00:17:05,774 --> 00:17:07,442
So when they decide to target you,
292
00:17:07,526 --> 00:17:09,360
they can actually
recreate your exact steps.
293
00:17:09,445 --> 00:17:12,113
With a MetroCard
and with a credit card, alone,
294
00:17:12,197 --> 00:17:14,323
like literally where you go
and what you buy,
295
00:17:14,408 --> 00:17:16,951
and potentially by linking
that data with other people
296
00:17:17,036 --> 00:17:19,078
on similar travel plans,
297
00:17:19,163 --> 00:17:21,914
they can figure out who you talk to
and who you met with.
298
00:17:21,999 --> 00:17:25,293
When you then take cell phone data,
which logs your location,
299
00:17:25,377 --> 00:17:27,295
and you link up purchasing data,
300
00:17:27,379 --> 00:17:30,048
MetroCard data,
and your debit card,
301
00:17:30,132 --> 00:17:32,592
you start to get
what you could call "metadata"
302
00:17:32,676 --> 00:17:34,719
in aggregate
over a person's life.
303
00:17:34,803 --> 00:17:37,722
And metadata,
in aggregate, is content.
304
00:17:37,806 --> 00:17:40,933
It tells a story about you
which is made up of facts,
305
00:17:41,018 --> 00:17:42,727
but is not necessarily true.
306
00:17:42,811 --> 00:17:44,812
So for example, just because
you were on the corner
307
00:17:44,897 --> 00:17:46,564
and all those data points
point to it,
308
00:17:46,648 --> 00:17:48,191
it doesn't mean
you committed the crime.
309
00:17:48,275 --> 00:17:50,109
So it's important to note that
310
00:17:50,194 --> 00:17:52,403
if someone has a perception
of you having done a thing,
311
00:17:52,488 --> 00:17:55,073
it will now follow you
for the rest of your life.
312
00:17:55,157 --> 00:17:57,700
So just keep in mind
that what happens to you guys,
313
00:17:57,785 --> 00:18:01,829
for example, with fingerprints
and retinal scans and photographs,
314
00:18:01,914 --> 00:18:04,373
that is what is going to
happen to people in the future
315
00:18:04,458 --> 00:18:06,959
when they resist policy changes
and when they try to protest
316
00:18:07,044 --> 00:18:09,212
in a totally constitutionally
protected way.
317
00:18:10,422 --> 00:18:13,341
This is for you, Director Clapper,
again on the surveillance front,
318
00:18:13,425 --> 00:18:16,010
and I hope we can do this
in just a yes or no answer
319
00:18:16,095 --> 00:18:18,346
because I know Senator Feinstein
wants to move on.
320
00:18:18,430 --> 00:18:23,559
So, does the NSA
collect any type of data at all
321
00:18:23,644 --> 00:18:27,563
on millions or hundreds
of millions of Americans?
322
00:18:27,648 --> 00:18:29,565
No, sir.
323
00:18:29,650 --> 00:18:31,484
It does not?
324
00:18:32,528 --> 00:18:34,695
Not wittingly.
325
00:18:34,780 --> 00:18:37,698
There are cases
where they could inadvertently,
326
00:18:37,783 --> 00:18:41,786
perhaps, collect, but not wittingly.
327
00:19:07,646 --> 00:19:11,357
The encrypted archive should
be available to you within seven days.
328
00:19:11,441 --> 00:19:14,152
The key will follow
when everything else is done.
329
00:19:16,071 --> 00:19:19,073
The material I provide,
and investigative effort required
330
00:19:19,158 --> 00:19:21,617
will be too much for any one person.
331
00:19:21,702 --> 00:19:25,204
I recommend at a very minimum,
you involve Glenn Greenwald.
332
00:19:25,289 --> 00:19:26,956
I believe you know him.
333
00:19:29,084 --> 00:19:30,501
The plain text of the payload
334
00:19:30,586 --> 00:19:33,337
will include my true name details
for the record...
335
00:19:34,339 --> 00:19:36,257
though it will be your decision
as to whether
336
00:19:36,341 --> 00:19:39,510
or how to declare my involvement.
337
00:19:39,595 --> 00:19:44,140
My personal desire is that you paint
the target directly on my back.
338
00:19:44,224 --> 00:19:47,185
No one, not even my most
trusted confidante,
339
00:19:47,269 --> 00:19:49,103
is aware of my intentions,
340
00:19:49,188 --> 00:19:53,774
and it would not be fair for them
to fall under suspicion for my actions.
341
00:19:53,859 --> 00:19:55,776
You may be the only one
who can prevent that,
342
00:19:55,861 --> 00:19:58,404
and that is by immediately
nailing me to the cross
343
00:19:58,488 --> 00:20:01,324
rather than trying
to protect me as a source.
344
00:20:03,952 --> 00:20:07,788
On timing, regarding
meeting up in Hong Kong.
345
00:20:07,873 --> 00:20:09,415
The first rendezvous attempt
346
00:20:09,499 --> 00:20:12,877
will be at 10:00 a.m. local time
on Monday.
347
00:20:12,961 --> 00:20:17,089
We will meet in the hallway outside
of a restaurant in the Mira Hotel.
348
00:20:18,258 --> 00:20:21,385
I will be working on a Rubik's Cube
so you can identify me.
349
00:20:22,638 --> 00:20:26,432
Approach me, and ask if I know
the hours of the restaurant.
350
00:20:26,516 --> 00:20:28,809
I'll respond by stating that
I'm not sure,
351
00:20:28,894 --> 00:20:31,562
and suggest you
try the lounge instead.
352
00:20:31,647 --> 00:20:35,024
I'll offer to show you where it is,
and at that point we're good.
353
00:20:36,026 --> 00:20:38,152
You simply need to follow naturally.
354
00:21:15,649 --> 00:21:18,109
As far as positioning,
I mean, if you want us to sit
355
00:21:18,193 --> 00:21:19,568
in any particular way or whatever.
356
00:21:19,653 --> 00:21:22,822
You know, I'm gonna go there,
to try to get better light.
357
00:21:32,040 --> 00:21:35,876
So, um, there's, you know,
so many different
358
00:21:35,961 --> 00:21:38,004
enormous stories
359
00:21:38,088 --> 00:21:40,464
just, that are kind of
stand alone stories,
360
00:21:41,466 --> 00:21:43,134
that even, like, you know,
361
00:21:43,218 --> 00:21:44,719
certain things
about an individual document
362
00:21:44,803 --> 00:21:46,304
that can just be
their own story.
363
00:21:46,388 --> 00:21:49,473
And I just want to start
churning those stories out.
364
00:21:49,558 --> 00:21:52,643
I basically woke up this morning
and already started writing stories.
365
00:21:52,728 --> 00:21:54,603
So I'm hoping to, you know,
366
00:21:54,688 --> 00:21:57,148
start publishing
like within a day or two days.
367
00:21:57,232 --> 00:21:59,233
- Okay.
- As long as you're good with that.
368
00:21:59,318 --> 00:22:00,901
- Yeah.
- Um, and...
369
00:22:00,986 --> 00:22:03,779
So, as far as like the stuff
we have to talk about,
370
00:22:03,864 --> 00:22:06,449
I'm kind of dichotomizing it,
371
00:22:07,951 --> 00:22:11,037
between stuff that
I'd like to talk to you about
372
00:22:11,121 --> 00:22:12,788
in terms of like the documents
and the content,
373
00:22:12,873 --> 00:22:14,498
and Laura has a bunch of
questions about that as well,
374
00:22:14,583 --> 00:22:16,000
sort of working
through the documents,
375
00:22:16,084 --> 00:22:18,919
getting your take on
a lot of this stuff that,
376
00:22:19,004 --> 00:22:20,421
you know, will help me
understand it better.
377
00:22:20,505 --> 00:22:22,798
But then also
the sort of "you" story,
378
00:22:22,883 --> 00:22:25,801
like the who you are, what you've done,
379
00:22:25,886 --> 00:22:27,511
why you've done what you've done.
380
00:22:27,596 --> 00:22:29,180
- Yeah.
- And I'd love to do that first.
381
00:22:29,264 --> 00:22:30,514
Okay.
382
00:22:30,599 --> 00:22:33,267
Um, in part because you're
the only one who can do that.
383
00:22:33,352 --> 00:22:36,395
So I'd just like to get that done
so that it's done, um,
384
00:22:36,480 --> 00:22:37,938
and also because, you know,
385
00:22:38,023 --> 00:22:40,149
it might be that
you want to do that early.
386
00:22:40,233 --> 00:22:42,068
- Because...
- Who knows what could happen...
387
00:22:42,152 --> 00:22:45,446
It might be necessary, we might
choose to have that done early.
388
00:22:45,530 --> 00:22:47,656
Tell me your thoughts on
where you are with that...
389
00:22:47,741 --> 00:22:49,158
The primary one on that,
390
00:22:49,242 --> 00:22:51,660
I think I've expressed that
a couple times online,
391
00:22:51,745 --> 00:22:56,707
is I feel the modern media has
a big focus on personalities.
392
00:22:56,792 --> 00:22:58,209
Totally.
393
00:22:58,293 --> 00:23:02,338
And I'm a little concerned
the more we focus on that,
394
00:23:02,422 --> 00:23:05,466
the more they're gonna use
that as a distraction.
395
00:23:05,550 --> 00:23:07,551
And I don't necessarily
want that to happen,
396
00:23:07,636 --> 00:23:09,845
which is why I've consistently
said, you know,
397
00:23:09,930 --> 00:23:11,472
"I'm not the story here."
398
00:23:11,556 --> 00:23:13,349
Um...
399
00:23:13,433 --> 00:23:14,433
Nervous, huh?
400
00:23:14,518 --> 00:23:15,935
No, it's a very, very cheap pen,
401
00:23:16,019 --> 00:23:18,396
that just with the slightest
force broke, go ahead.
402
00:23:19,898 --> 00:23:22,108
But uh, yeah,
403
00:23:22,192 --> 00:23:24,985
anything I can do
to help you guys
404
00:23:25,070 --> 00:23:26,862
get this out I will do.
405
00:23:26,947 --> 00:23:31,617
I don't have,
uh, any experience with media,
406
00:23:31,701 --> 00:23:36,705
with how this works,
so I'm kind of learning as I go.
407
00:23:36,790 --> 00:23:39,125
Right,
so I just want to get a sense
408
00:23:39,209 --> 00:23:41,210
of why did you decide to do
what you've done.
409
00:23:41,294 --> 00:23:45,089
So, for me,
it all comes down to state power
410
00:23:45,173 --> 00:23:49,510
against the peoples' ability to
meaningfully oppose that power.
411
00:23:49,594 --> 00:23:52,221
And I'm sitting there,
uh, every day
412
00:23:52,305 --> 00:23:55,516
getting paid to design methods
413
00:23:55,600 --> 00:23:58,769
to amplify that state power.
414
00:23:58,854 --> 00:24:00,896
And I'm realizing that
if, you know,
415
00:24:00,981 --> 00:24:03,649
the policy switches
that are the only things
416
00:24:03,733 --> 00:24:05,985
that restrain these states,
417
00:24:06,069 --> 00:24:08,529
were changed, there...
418
00:24:08,613 --> 00:24:10,281
you couldn't
meaningfully oppose these.
419
00:24:10,365 --> 00:24:11,866
I mean you would have to be
420
00:24:11,950 --> 00:24:13,617
the most
incredibly sophisticated,
421
00:24:13,702 --> 00:24:15,536
technical actor in existence.
422
00:24:15,620 --> 00:24:17,997
I mean,
I'm not sure there's anybody,
423
00:24:18,081 --> 00:24:20,791
no matter how gifted you are,
424
00:24:20,876 --> 00:24:23,669
who could oppose
all of the offices
425
00:24:23,753 --> 00:24:26,881
and all the bright people,
even all the mediocre people
426
00:24:26,965 --> 00:24:30,009
out there with all of their tools
and all their capabilities.
427
00:24:30,093 --> 00:24:33,971
And as I saw the promise
of the Obama administration
428
00:24:34,055 --> 00:24:36,265
be betrayed
and walked away from
429
00:24:36,349 --> 00:24:38,726
and in fact, actually advance...
430
00:24:38,810 --> 00:24:39,810
Uh-huh, uh-huh.
431
00:24:39,895 --> 00:24:42,146
...the things
that had been promised
432
00:24:42,230 --> 00:24:46,192
to be sort of curtailed
and reigned in and dialed back,
433
00:24:46,276 --> 00:24:48,944
and actually get worse,
particularly drone strikes,
434
00:24:49,029 --> 00:24:50,446
which I also learned at NSA,
435
00:24:50,530 --> 00:24:54,158
we could watch drone videos
from our desktops.
436
00:24:57,037 --> 00:24:59,830
As I saw that, that really
hardened me to action.
437
00:24:59,915 --> 00:25:01,582
- In real time?
- In real time.
438
00:25:01,666 --> 00:25:04,084
Yeah, you... it'll stream
439
00:25:04,169 --> 00:25:06,962
a lower quality of the video
to your desktop.
440
00:25:07,047 --> 00:25:09,089
Typically you'd be watching
surveillance drones
441
00:25:09,174 --> 00:25:11,425
as opposed to actually
like you know murder drones
442
00:25:11,510 --> 00:25:13,469
where they're going out there
and bomb somebody.
443
00:25:13,553 --> 00:25:16,388
But you'll have a drone that's just
following somebody's house
444
00:25:16,473 --> 00:25:18,098
for hours and hours.
445
00:25:18,183 --> 00:25:19,600
And you won't know who it is,
446
00:25:19,684 --> 00:25:22,228
because you don't have
the context for that.
447
00:25:22,312 --> 00:25:23,979
But it's just a page,
448
00:25:24,064 --> 00:25:26,857
where it's lists
and lists of drone feeds
449
00:25:26,942 --> 00:25:28,359
in all these
different countries,
450
00:25:28,443 --> 00:25:30,110
under all these
different code names,
451
00:25:30,195 --> 00:25:32,321
and you can just click on
which one you want to see.
452
00:25:34,783 --> 00:25:37,117
Right,
but, so if your self-interest
453
00:25:37,202 --> 00:25:40,371
is to live in a world in which
there's maximum privacy,
454
00:25:40,455 --> 00:25:43,165
doing something
that could put you into prison,
455
00:25:43,250 --> 00:25:45,751
in which your privacy
is completely destroyed,
456
00:25:45,835 --> 00:25:47,753
is sort of
the antithesis of that.
457
00:25:47,837 --> 00:25:51,882
How did you reach the point where that
was a worthwhile calculation for you?
458
00:25:51,967 --> 00:25:55,427
I remember what the Internet was like
before it was being watched,
459
00:25:55,512 --> 00:25:58,347
and there's never been anything
in the history of man that's like it.
460
00:25:58,431 --> 00:26:01,892
I mean,
you could again have children
461
00:26:01,977 --> 00:26:06,230
from one part of the world
having an equal discussion
462
00:26:06,314 --> 00:26:08,774
where, you know,
they were sort of granted,
463
00:26:08,858 --> 00:26:12,945
um, the same respect
for their ideas and conversation,
464
00:26:13,029 --> 00:26:15,781
with experts in a field
from another part of the world,
465
00:26:15,865 --> 00:26:20,661
on any topic, anywhere,
anytime, all the time.
466
00:26:20,745 --> 00:26:22,621
And it was free
and unrestrained.
467
00:26:22,706 --> 00:26:25,916
And we've seen,
uh, the chilling of that
468
00:26:26,001 --> 00:26:28,043
and the cooling of that
and the changing of that model,
469
00:26:28,128 --> 00:26:31,755
toward something in which people
self-police their own views,
470
00:26:31,840 --> 00:26:34,800
and they literally make jokes
about ending up on "the list"
471
00:26:34,884 --> 00:26:37,428
if they donate
to a political cause
472
00:26:37,512 --> 00:26:39,513
or if they say something
in a discussion.
473
00:26:39,598 --> 00:26:42,766
Uh, and it's become an expectation
474
00:26:42,851 --> 00:26:44,810
that we're being watched.
475
00:26:44,894 --> 00:26:46,937
Um, many people I've talked to
have mentioned that
476
00:26:47,022 --> 00:26:49,690
they're careful about what
they type into search engines
477
00:26:49,774 --> 00:26:51,567
because they know that
it's being recorded.
478
00:26:51,651 --> 00:26:56,447
And that limits the boundaries
of their intellectual exploration.
479
00:26:56,531 --> 00:27:00,034
Uh... and I'm...
480
00:27:01,161 --> 00:27:06,707
I am more willing
to risk imprisonment,
481
00:27:06,791 --> 00:27:10,419
or any other negative outcome,
personally,
482
00:27:10,503 --> 00:27:14,089
than I am willing to risk
483
00:27:14,174 --> 00:27:16,842
the curtailment
of my intellectual freedom
484
00:27:16,926 --> 00:27:20,346
and that of those around me
485
00:27:20,430 --> 00:27:24,350
whom I care for, uh,
equally, as I do for myself.
486
00:27:24,434 --> 00:27:27,436
And again, that's not to say
that I'm self-sacrificing,
487
00:27:27,520 --> 00:27:29,855
because it gives me...
488
00:27:29,939 --> 00:27:33,192
I feel good
in my human experience
489
00:27:33,276 --> 00:27:35,569
to know that I can contribute
to the good of others.
490
00:27:52,045 --> 00:27:53,837
Could you elaborate on that?
491
00:27:53,922 --> 00:27:58,384
So, I don't know
how much of the programs
492
00:27:58,468 --> 00:28:01,762
and the actual technical capacities
everybody's talked to you about,
493
00:28:01,846 --> 00:28:06,058
but there's an infrastructure in place
in the United States and worldwide...
494
00:28:07,227 --> 00:28:09,395
that NSA has built,
495
00:28:09,479 --> 00:28:12,981
in cooperation with
other governments as well...
496
00:28:14,567 --> 00:28:20,698
that intercepts basically
every digital communication,
497
00:28:20,782 --> 00:28:25,786
every radio communication,
every analog communication
498
00:28:25,870 --> 00:28:29,164
that it has sensors in place
to detect.
499
00:28:29,249 --> 00:28:34,044
And with these capabilities,
basically,
500
00:28:34,129 --> 00:28:38,173
the vast majority of human
501
00:28:38,258 --> 00:28:40,926
and computer-to-computer
communications,
502
00:28:41,010 --> 00:28:42,553
device-based communications,
503
00:28:42,637 --> 00:28:44,430
which sort of
inform the relationships
504
00:28:44,514 --> 00:28:46,265
between humans,
505
00:28:46,349 --> 00:28:50,394
are automatically ingested
without targeting.
506
00:28:50,478 --> 00:28:53,814
And that allows individuals
to retroactively
507
00:28:53,898 --> 00:28:58,444
search your communications
based on self-certifications.
508
00:28:58,528 --> 00:29:04,199
So, for example, if I wanted to see
the content of your email,
509
00:29:04,284 --> 00:29:08,704
or, you know, your wife's phone calls,
or anything like that,
510
00:29:08,788 --> 00:29:12,958
all I have to do is
use what's called a "selector,"
511
00:29:13,042 --> 00:29:18,213
any kind of thing
in the communications chain
512
00:29:18,298 --> 00:29:21,216
that might uniquely
or almost uniquely
513
00:29:21,301 --> 00:29:22,801
identify you as an individual.
514
00:29:22,886 --> 00:29:25,179
And I'm talking about things
like email addresses,
515
00:29:25,263 --> 00:29:28,557
IP addresses, phone numbers,
credit cards,
516
00:29:28,641 --> 00:29:31,977
um, even passwords
that are unique to you
517
00:29:32,061 --> 00:29:34,938
that aren't used by anyone else.
518
00:29:35,023 --> 00:29:37,357
I can input those
into the system,
519
00:29:37,442 --> 00:29:39,485
and it will not only go back
through the database
520
00:29:39,569 --> 00:29:43,614
and go, "Have I seen this
anywhere in the past?"
521
00:29:43,698 --> 00:29:45,199
It will,
522
00:29:45,283 --> 00:29:48,368
basically put an additional
level of scrutiny on it,
523
00:29:48,453 --> 00:29:50,746
moving into the future,
that says,
524
00:29:50,830 --> 00:29:53,624
"If this is detected now
or at anytime in the future
525
00:29:53,708 --> 00:29:56,335
I want this
to go to me immediately,
526
00:29:56,419 --> 00:29:58,212
and alert me in real time"
527
00:29:58,296 --> 00:29:59,755
that you're communicating
with someone.
528
00:29:59,839 --> 00:30:01,256
Things like that.
529
00:30:05,345 --> 00:30:07,763
So I don't know who you are
or anything about you.
530
00:30:07,847 --> 00:30:10,140
Okay. Um...
531
00:30:10,225 --> 00:30:14,394
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton,
532
00:30:14,479 --> 00:30:16,230
a defense contractor,
533
00:30:16,314 --> 00:30:18,857
I'm sort of on loan to NSA.
534
00:30:18,942 --> 00:30:20,400
I don't talk to
a Booz Allen boss,
535
00:30:20,485 --> 00:30:23,070
I don't get tasking from Booz Allen,
it's all from NSA.
536
00:30:23,154 --> 00:30:25,906
- Sorry, I don't know your name.
- Oh, sorry!
537
00:30:25,990 --> 00:30:28,909
I, uh...
my name is Edward Snowden.
538
00:30:28,993 --> 00:30:31,370
I go by Ed. Um...
539
00:30:31,454 --> 00:30:33,747
Edward Joseph Snowden
is the full name.
540
00:30:33,832 --> 00:30:37,084
- S-N...
- O-W-D-E-N
541
00:30:37,168 --> 00:30:38,418
And where are you from?
542
00:30:38,503 --> 00:30:41,922
I'm originally,
I was born in North Carolina,
543
00:30:42,006 --> 00:30:44,258
uh, small town, Elizabeth City.
544
00:30:44,342 --> 00:30:47,427
There's a Coast Guard station there.
I'm from a military family.
545
00:30:47,512 --> 00:30:49,555
But I spent most of my time
546
00:30:49,639 --> 00:30:53,016
growing up around Fort Meade
in Maryland.
547
00:30:54,769 --> 00:30:58,939
And your family,
what's the consequences for them?
548
00:30:59,023 --> 00:31:03,402
This is actually
what has made this hardest.
549
00:31:03,486 --> 00:31:07,072
My family doesn't know
what's happening.
550
00:31:07,156 --> 00:31:08,574
They're unaware.
551
00:31:09,784 --> 00:31:15,080
I don't think I'll be able
to keep the family ties
552
00:31:15,164 --> 00:31:19,835
that I've had for my life, um,
553
00:31:19,919 --> 00:31:23,213
because of the risk
of associating them with this.
554
00:31:23,298 --> 00:31:26,800
And I'll leave, you know,
what to publish on this
555
00:31:26,885 --> 00:31:28,468
and what not to publish
to you guys.
556
00:31:28,553 --> 00:31:31,555
I trust you
to be responsible on this.
557
00:31:31,639 --> 00:31:36,310
Um, but basically,
the closer I stay to my family,
558
00:31:36,394 --> 00:31:38,520
the more likely they are to be
leaned on, you know.
559
00:31:38,605 --> 00:31:40,063
So you don't want me
to report this?
560
00:31:40,148 --> 00:31:43,692
I mean, we definitely
want to do whatever we can
561
00:31:43,776 --> 00:31:46,737
not to include them
or bring them into the mix.
562
00:31:46,821 --> 00:31:49,323
Yeah, yeah, sure,
that's fine, I won't...
563
00:31:49,407 --> 00:31:50,532
I'm sorry, let me interrupt you.
564
00:31:50,617 --> 00:31:53,452
Can we just stop for a second and do
the documents and then go back to that?
565
00:31:53,536 --> 00:31:54,536
- Does that makes sense?
- Sure.
566
00:31:54,621 --> 00:31:56,038
What do I need?
567
00:31:56,122 --> 00:31:58,707
Do I need an email address
that we're using, or...?
568
00:31:58,791 --> 00:32:00,876
Well, so you can, you can send them...
569
00:32:00,960 --> 00:32:03,754
once you've encrypted it, you can send it
from whatever you think is appropriate.
570
00:32:03,838 --> 00:32:06,673
The main thing is you've got
to encapsulate all of this
571
00:32:06,758 --> 00:32:11,136
in a way that it can't be
decrypted and read
572
00:32:11,220 --> 00:32:13,096
when it's in transit
across the network...
573
00:32:13,181 --> 00:32:14,431
Right.
574
00:32:14,515 --> 00:32:16,725
...or on either of the end
points that it's received at.
575
00:32:16,809 --> 00:32:18,226
Just so you know,
these documents are
576
00:32:18,311 --> 00:32:20,020
basically all gonna be uploaded
577
00:32:20,104 --> 00:32:22,522
in like 48 hours,
72 hours, whatever...
578
00:32:22,607 --> 00:32:25,233
This is simply... you want to get in
the process of doing this for everything,
579
00:32:25,318 --> 00:32:28,278
because it seems hard, but it's not hard,
his is super easy.
580
00:32:28,363 --> 00:32:30,238
So just walk me through it, and...
581
00:32:30,323 --> 00:32:33,033
Okay. Show me... show me
the actual folder structure
582
00:32:33,117 --> 00:32:34,743
where these files are first.
583
00:32:38,122 --> 00:32:40,248
How many documents
did you say there were?
584
00:32:40,333 --> 00:32:41,541
Seven.
585
00:32:41,626 --> 00:32:42,960
Well, while you're working
did you want to...?
586
00:32:43,044 --> 00:32:45,712
Okay, go ahead.
587
00:32:45,797 --> 00:32:47,547
How many documents
are we talking about?
588
00:32:47,632 --> 00:32:49,716
Because when The Guardian
did WikiLeaks,
589
00:32:49,801 --> 00:32:52,052
technical people set up a system
590
00:32:52,136 --> 00:32:55,138
so they were available
for anybody to see.
591
00:32:55,223 --> 00:32:58,809
And I just wondered
if it's possible to do the same thing?
592
00:32:58,893 --> 00:33:01,937
That would be
the ideal end game,
593
00:33:02,021 --> 00:33:06,942
um, but because
some of these documents
594
00:33:07,026 --> 00:33:09,528
are legitimately classified
in ways
595
00:33:09,612 --> 00:33:12,614
that could cause harm to people
and methods...
596
00:33:13,616 --> 00:33:17,035
I'm comfortable in my technical
ability to protect them,
597
00:33:17,120 --> 00:33:18,787
I mean you could literally
shoot me or torture me,
598
00:33:18,871 --> 00:33:22,457
and I could not disclose
the password if I wanted to.
599
00:33:22,542 --> 00:33:27,212
Um, you know, I have
the sophistication to do that.
600
00:33:27,296 --> 00:33:30,090
There are some journalists
that I think could do that,
601
00:33:30,174 --> 00:33:32,801
but there are a number of them
that couldn't.
602
00:33:32,885 --> 00:33:34,761
But the question becomes,
603
00:33:34,846 --> 00:33:40,350
can an organization actually
control that information
604
00:33:40,435 --> 00:33:42,978
in that manner without risking
605
00:33:43,062 --> 00:33:44,855
basically
an uncontrolled disclosure?
606
00:33:44,939 --> 00:33:46,606
But I do agree with that.
607
00:33:46,691 --> 00:33:49,359
Honestly,
I don't want to be the person
608
00:33:49,444 --> 00:33:50,861
making the decisions on
609
00:33:50,945 --> 00:33:52,571
what should be public
and what shouldn't.
610
00:33:52,655 --> 00:33:56,366
Which is why, rather than
publishing these on my own,
611
00:33:56,451 --> 00:33:59,870
or putting them out openly,
I'm running them through journalists.
612
00:33:59,954 --> 00:34:02,956
So that my bias,
you know, and my things...
613
00:34:03,041 --> 00:34:05,751
Because clearly
I have some strongly held views,
614
00:34:05,835 --> 00:34:07,252
are removed from that equation,
615
00:34:07,336 --> 00:34:09,671
and the public interest
is being represented
616
00:34:09,756 --> 00:34:11,173
in the most responsible manner.
617
00:34:11,257 --> 00:34:13,258
Yeah.
618
00:34:13,342 --> 00:34:17,137
Actually, given your sort of,
you know,
619
00:34:17,221 --> 00:34:21,641
geographic familiarity
with the UK and whatnot,
620
00:34:21,726 --> 00:34:27,606
I'd like to point out
that GCHQ has, uh,
621
00:34:27,690 --> 00:34:30,358
probably the most invasive...
622
00:34:30,443 --> 00:34:32,277
I've heard about that.
623
00:34:32,361 --> 00:34:34,529
...network intercept program
anywhere in the world.
624
00:34:34,614 --> 00:34:35,989
Yeah, yeah.
625
00:34:36,074 --> 00:34:39,618
It's called Tempora,
T-E-M-P-O-R-A,
626
00:34:39,702 --> 00:34:42,370
and it's the world's first
"full take,"
627
00:34:42,455 --> 00:34:43,914
they call it,
and that means content
628
00:34:43,998 --> 00:34:46,208
in addition to metadata,
on everything.
629
00:34:49,253 --> 00:34:52,130
Um, so this is what
I'd like to do in terms of scheduling,
630
00:34:52,215 --> 00:34:53,840
if it's good with everybody else.
631
00:34:53,925 --> 00:34:56,927
Um, are you... do you feel like
you're done with what you...?
632
00:34:57,011 --> 00:34:58,428
I am done.
633
00:34:58,513 --> 00:35:02,182
I'm anxious to go back,
get those articles done.
634
00:35:02,266 --> 00:35:04,976
And then there's a bunch of
documents that aren't about
635
00:35:05,061 --> 00:35:07,229
those first two or three stories that
I'd like to spend time with you...
636
00:35:07,313 --> 00:35:09,439
- Sure, yeah...
- ...you know, kind of going over it.
637
00:35:09,524 --> 00:35:11,691
- Um, and...
- I'm not going anywhere!
638
00:35:11,776 --> 00:35:14,152
You're available?
You want to check your book first?
639
00:35:14,237 --> 00:35:17,197
Yeah! Let me...
uh... let me check my schedule.
640
00:35:17,281 --> 00:35:18,448
Is that good for you, Laura?
641
00:35:18,533 --> 00:35:19,866
- It's great.
- Okay.
642
00:35:35,883 --> 00:35:37,717
Hello?
643
00:35:37,802 --> 00:35:39,469
Yes.
644
00:35:39,554 --> 00:35:41,930
My meal was great,
thank you very much.
645
00:35:45,268 --> 00:35:47,811
No, I still have some left, and I think
I'm gonna be eating it later.
646
00:35:47,895 --> 00:35:50,063
So, uh, you can just
leave me alone for now.
647
00:35:52,400 --> 00:35:54,442
Okay, great.
Thank you so much.
648
00:35:54,527 --> 00:35:56,027
Have a good one.
Bye.
649
00:35:57,822 --> 00:36:00,824
Let's fix that real quick.
650
00:36:03,703 --> 00:36:05,871
So uh, another fun thing,
I was telling Laura about this:
651
00:36:05,955 --> 00:36:08,874
all these new VOIP phones,
they have little computers in them,
652
00:36:08,958 --> 00:36:11,001
and you can hot mic these
over the network...
653
00:36:11,085 --> 00:36:12,919
all the time,
even when the receiver's down.
654
00:36:13,004 --> 00:36:16,464
So as long as it's plugged in,
it can be listening in on you.
655
00:36:16,549 --> 00:36:18,967
And I hadn't even considered
that earlier, but yeah.
656
00:36:19,051 --> 00:36:20,051
Okay.
657
00:36:20,136 --> 00:36:22,971
There are so many ways
this could be...
658
00:36:23,055 --> 00:36:26,016
Everything in here is gonna be
on the public record at some point.
659
00:36:26,100 --> 00:36:28,101
We, we should operate on that,
that basis, because...
660
00:36:28,186 --> 00:36:29,394
Yeah, we are.
661
00:36:29,478 --> 00:36:30,770
Do you have your
air-gapped machine with you?
662
00:36:30,855 --> 00:36:32,147
I do, I do.
663
00:36:32,231 --> 00:36:33,815
You can pop that out.
664
00:36:37,820 --> 00:36:39,279
Do you have an understanding
or commitment
665
00:36:39,363 --> 00:36:42,657
on when you guys are going to
press with the first stories?
666
00:36:42,742 --> 00:36:44,910
I suppose seven or
eight in the morning in London.
667
00:36:44,994 --> 00:36:46,369
Uh-huh, okay.
668
00:36:48,456 --> 00:36:50,248
Now let's see here.
669
00:36:58,007 --> 00:36:59,841
Oh, hey, look,
there's the other one.
670
00:37:00,968 --> 00:37:03,261
Pro tip, let's not leave
the same SD cards
671
00:37:03,346 --> 00:37:05,388
in our laptops forever,
in the future.
672
00:37:12,230 --> 00:37:16,524
Did you know this was still
kicking around in your laptop?
673
00:37:16,609 --> 00:37:17,943
Yeah, um, that was the...
674
00:37:18,027 --> 00:37:20,111
- Okay, just making sure.
- Okay, yeah.
675
00:37:21,113 --> 00:37:23,323
- This is that.
- Right there.
676
00:37:23,407 --> 00:37:26,534
You will have a new one that looks exactly
identical that's a different archive,
677
00:37:26,619 --> 00:37:30,330
so you might want to
take a Sharpie to it, or something.
678
00:37:30,414 --> 00:37:33,708
Could you pass me
my magic mantle of power?
679
00:37:33,793 --> 00:37:36,169
Mm-hmm.
I'm gonna go pick up...
680
00:37:42,009 --> 00:37:44,552
Is that about the possibility of...
681
00:37:44,637 --> 00:37:46,763
Visual...
yeah, visual collection.
682
00:37:53,688 --> 00:37:56,856
I don't think at this point there's
anything that will shock us.
683
00:37:56,941 --> 00:37:59,943
We've become pretty...
684
00:38:00,027 --> 00:38:03,113
In fact, Ewen said before, he's like,
he's like "I'm never leaving my room...
685
00:38:03,197 --> 00:38:06,074
I'm never leaving anything in my room
again, not a single machine."
686
00:38:06,158 --> 00:38:08,243
I was like, "You've been
infected by the paranoia bug.
687
00:38:08,327 --> 00:38:10,328
- Happens to all of us!"
- Yeah.
688
00:38:10,413 --> 00:38:11,830
The way he said it, he was like,
689
00:38:11,914 --> 00:38:16,251
"I would never leave a single device
in the room again alone."
690
00:38:16,335 --> 00:38:17,627
My bag is getting heavier
and heavier.
691
00:38:22,300 --> 00:38:23,717
That's your evil influence, Ed.
692
00:38:23,801 --> 00:38:26,469
All right, I'm going need you
to enter your root password
693
00:38:26,554 --> 00:38:28,346
because I don't know what it is.
694
00:38:30,182 --> 00:38:32,851
If you want to use this,
you're more than welcome to.
695
00:38:33,853 --> 00:38:35,979
Looks like your root password's about
four characters long anyway, so...
696
00:38:36,063 --> 00:38:39,524
It's usually a lot longer, but
that's just a one-time-only thing, right?
697
00:38:39,608 --> 00:38:40,984
So it is... uh...
698
00:38:41,068 --> 00:38:43,278
It had been a lot longer,
but ever since I knew that
699
00:38:43,362 --> 00:38:45,030
it was just like a one time
only session one,
700
00:38:45,114 --> 00:38:47,532
I've been making it shorter.
Is that not good?
701
00:38:47,616 --> 00:38:51,161
It's actually not.
I was expressing this with Laura.
702
00:38:51,245 --> 00:38:54,164
The issue is, because of the fact that
it's got a hardware mac address
703
00:38:54,248 --> 00:38:55,665
and things like that,
if people are able
704
00:38:55,750 --> 00:38:59,294
to identify your machine,
and they're able to...
705
00:38:59,378 --> 00:39:01,796
This is the fact you're about
to break the most upsetting story...
706
00:39:01,881 --> 00:39:03,048
Right,
that's true, that's true.
707
00:39:03,132 --> 00:39:04,799
Yeah, so they might kind of
prioritize you...
708
00:39:04,884 --> 00:39:07,010
It's ten letters.
I type very quickly.
709
00:39:07,094 --> 00:39:08,303
It actually is ten letters.
710
00:39:08,387 --> 00:39:10,555
Okay, so ten letters would be good
711
00:39:10,639 --> 00:39:12,932
if they had to brute force
the entire keyspace.
712
00:39:13,017 --> 00:39:14,434
Right.
713
00:39:14,518 --> 00:39:17,270
That would still probably
only take a couple days for NSA.
714
00:39:20,399 --> 00:39:22,817
That's a fire alarm.
715
00:39:22,902 --> 00:39:24,235
Okay.
716
00:39:25,654 --> 00:39:28,948
Hopefully it just sounds like
a three second test.
717
00:39:29,033 --> 00:39:32,118
Or is... do you want to call
the desk and ask?
718
00:39:33,996 --> 00:39:35,288
I think it's fine.
719
00:39:35,373 --> 00:39:37,540
Yeah, I don't think it's an issue,
but it's interesting that it just...
720
00:39:37,625 --> 00:39:39,417
Did that happen before?
721
00:39:39,502 --> 00:39:41,211
Maybe they got mad when
they couldn't listen in to us
722
00:39:41,295 --> 00:39:42,796
via the phone anymore.
723
00:39:44,507 --> 00:39:47,217
Has the fire alarm
gone off before?
724
00:39:47,301 --> 00:39:49,969
No, that's the first time
that's happened.
725
00:39:50,054 --> 00:39:51,471
Let me see, just in case,
726
00:39:51,555 --> 00:39:54,182
they've got an alert
that goes to...
727
00:39:55,267 --> 00:39:57,102
That's unusual.
728
00:39:59,563 --> 00:40:01,940
- You probably...
- We might have to evacuate.
729
00:40:02,024 --> 00:40:03,483
...shouldn't ignore that.
730
00:40:03,567 --> 00:40:06,027
I don't know.
731
00:40:06,112 --> 00:40:09,197
- It's not continuous.
- It's not continuous.
732
00:40:09,281 --> 00:40:12,200
No, I'm just saying, if it continues.
733
00:40:14,954 --> 00:40:17,872
And then we go and we
meet the guys down in the lobby...
734
00:40:17,957 --> 00:40:19,582
- Yeah, right?
- Yeah.
735
00:40:20,751 --> 00:40:23,002
Yeah, let's uh,
let's leave it for now.
736
00:40:23,087 --> 00:40:25,338
Let me just finish this up.
737
00:40:27,258 --> 00:40:28,383
All right.
738
00:40:37,935 --> 00:40:39,352
Not that they're going to answer,
739
00:40:39,437 --> 00:40:41,438
because they probably got
like 7,000 calls.
740
00:40:44,733 --> 00:40:46,776
Hi, uh, we hear a loud buzzing
741
00:40:46,861 --> 00:40:49,028
on the tenth floor,
can you tell us what that is?
742
00:40:51,740 --> 00:40:53,283
Oh, okay.
743
00:40:53,367 --> 00:40:55,785
Okay great. Thank you.
Bye.
744
00:40:56,954 --> 00:40:58,788
Fire alarm
testing maintenance.
745
00:40:58,873 --> 00:41:00,790
That's good.
That's what we wanted to hear.
746
00:41:00,875 --> 00:41:03,293
Nice of them to uh...
747
00:41:03,377 --> 00:41:06,004
...nice of them to let us know
about that in advance.
748
00:41:09,383 --> 00:41:10,800
Um...
749
00:41:10,885 --> 00:41:12,760
I just wanted to
give you kind of a quick tour,
750
00:41:12,845 --> 00:41:15,180
uh, when Laura was looking at this,
she was kind of salivating
751
00:41:15,264 --> 00:41:17,307
and couldn't stop actually
reading the documents...
752
00:41:17,391 --> 00:41:18,391
Right, right.
753
00:41:18,476 --> 00:41:21,311
So we'll try and restrain ourselves
without promising that we'll succeed.
754
00:41:21,395 --> 00:41:23,146
Yeah, I just wanted
to kind of explain
755
00:41:23,230 --> 00:41:25,273
a brief overview
of what these are
756
00:41:25,357 --> 00:41:26,774
and how they're organized.
757
00:41:26,859 --> 00:41:28,818
Um, the beginning are
just some documents of interest.
758
00:41:28,903 --> 00:41:30,570
The primary purpose
of the second archive
759
00:41:30,654 --> 00:41:33,156
is to bring the focus
over to SSO,
760
00:41:33,240 --> 00:41:34,824
as opposed to uh, PRISM.
761
00:41:34,909 --> 00:41:36,784
And this is in general.
762
00:41:36,869 --> 00:41:38,912
SSO are
the Special Source Operations,
763
00:41:38,996 --> 00:41:43,208
those are the worldwide
passive collection on networks.
764
00:41:43,292 --> 00:41:45,919
They're both domestic to the US
and international.
765
00:41:47,379 --> 00:41:48,713
There's a lot of different ways
they do it,
766
00:41:48,797 --> 00:41:52,050
but corporate partnerships
are one of the primary things,
767
00:41:52,134 --> 00:41:54,594
uh, they do domestically,
they also do this with multinationals
768
00:41:54,678 --> 00:41:57,305
that might be headquartered
in the US they can kind of coerce,
769
00:41:57,389 --> 00:41:59,849
or just pay into giving them access.
770
00:41:59,934 --> 00:42:03,228
And they also do it bilaterally, with
the assistance of certain governments.
771
00:42:03,312 --> 00:42:05,188
And that's basically
on the premise that they go,
772
00:42:05,272 --> 00:42:06,981
"All right, we'll help you
set this system up
773
00:42:07,066 --> 00:42:08,942
if you give us
all the data from it."
774
00:42:09,026 --> 00:42:10,485
Um, so yeah...
775
00:42:10,569 --> 00:42:13,071
There's, there's...
776
00:42:13,155 --> 00:42:16,866
There's a lot more in here than any
one person or probably one team could do.
777
00:42:16,951 --> 00:42:17,992
Right.
778
00:42:18,077 --> 00:42:21,996
Um, XKeyscore DeepDive,
XKeyscore in general,
779
00:42:22,081 --> 00:42:23,957
and there's a huge folder
of documentation
780
00:42:24,041 --> 00:42:26,125
on XKeyscore and how it works,
781
00:42:26,210 --> 00:42:28,878
is the front-end system that analysts use
782
00:42:28,963 --> 00:42:32,006
for querying that sort of ocean of
raw SIGINT that I was telling you about.
783
00:42:32,091 --> 00:42:35,635
All of that stuff where you can
sort of do the retroactive searches
784
00:42:35,719 --> 00:42:37,512
and live searches
and get flagging and whatnot,
785
00:42:37,596 --> 00:42:42,016
XKeyscore is the front end
for that.
786
00:42:42,101 --> 00:42:43,768
I'm just gonna show you
one slide here
787
00:42:43,852 --> 00:42:46,396
'cause Laura thought
it was valuable,
788
00:42:46,480 --> 00:42:48,898
and I was talking about
kind of how these,
789
00:42:48,983 --> 00:42:54,153
uh, capabilities ramp up
in sophistication over time.
790
00:42:54,238 --> 00:42:57,156
This is kinda nice.
As of fiscal year 2011,
791
00:42:57,241 --> 00:43:01,077
they could monitor one billion
telephone or Internet sessions
792
00:43:01,161 --> 00:43:04,539
simultaneously
per one of these devices.
793
00:43:04,623 --> 00:43:09,877
And they could collect at the rate
of about 125 gigabytes a second,
794
00:43:09,962 --> 00:43:11,379
which is a terabit.
795
00:43:11,463 --> 00:43:13,006
That's just
each one of these devices.
796
00:43:13,090 --> 00:43:14,674
That's for each one of these,
yeah.
797
00:43:14,758 --> 00:43:17,093
And how many Tumult
machines would there be, then?
798
00:43:17,177 --> 00:43:20,430
Uh... per this, back then,
there were 20 sites,
799
00:43:20,514 --> 00:43:24,851
there's 10 at DOD installations,
but these are all outdated.
800
00:43:24,935 --> 00:43:27,020
We've expanded pretty rapidly.
801
00:43:28,522 --> 00:43:31,232
But still 20 sites,
that's at least 20 billion.
802
00:43:31,317 --> 00:43:33,192
This all needs
to get out, you know I mean?
803
00:43:33,277 --> 00:43:34,819
It's like...
804
00:43:34,903 --> 00:43:40,199
just in terms of understanding
the capabilities. It's so opaque.
805
00:43:40,284 --> 00:43:43,453
It's not science fiction.
This stuff is happening right now.
806
00:43:43,537 --> 00:43:46,456
No, that's what I mean, it's like,
the, the magnitude of it, and...
807
00:43:46,540 --> 00:43:51,044
...and, like, this is a pretty
inaccessible technical document,
808
00:43:51,128 --> 00:43:54,047
but even this,
like, is really chilling.
809
00:43:54,131 --> 00:43:55,465
- Do you know what I mean?
- Yeah.
810
00:43:55,549 --> 00:43:58,217
Yeah, I mean we should have...
we should be having debates about
811
00:43:58,302 --> 00:43:59,719
whether we want governments...
812
00:43:59,803 --> 00:44:02,555
I mean, this is massive
and extraordinary.
813
00:44:02,640 --> 00:44:04,098
It's amazing.
814
00:44:04,183 --> 00:44:06,851
Even though you know it,
even though you know that...
815
00:44:06,935 --> 00:44:10,355
...to see it, like,
the physical blueprints of it,
816
00:44:10,439 --> 00:44:12,690
and sort of
the technical expressions of it,
817
00:44:12,775 --> 00:44:15,693
really hits home
in like a super visceral way
818
00:44:15,778 --> 00:44:17,320
that is so needed.
819
00:44:22,284 --> 00:44:24,452
This is CNN Breaking News.
820
00:44:24,536 --> 00:44:28,331
An explosive new report
is reigniting the concerns
821
00:44:28,415 --> 00:44:32,502
that your privacy is being violated
to protect America's security.
822
00:44:32,586 --> 00:44:36,381
It reveals a court order giving
the National Security Agency
823
00:44:36,465 --> 00:44:41,302
blanket access to millions of Verizon
customers' records on a daily basis.
824
00:44:41,387 --> 00:44:43,888
Earlier I had the chance to
conduct the first TV interview
825
00:44:43,972 --> 00:44:47,100
with the reporter who broke
this story wide open:
826
00:44:47,184 --> 00:44:49,227
Glenn Greenwald of The Guardian.
827
00:44:50,229 --> 00:44:51,521
Congratulations on the scoop.
828
00:44:51,605 --> 00:44:55,858
Explain for our viewers
why this is important.
829
00:44:55,943 --> 00:44:58,152
It's important
because people have understood
830
00:44:58,237 --> 00:44:59,821
that the law that this was done under,
831
00:44:59,905 --> 00:45:02,573
which is the Patriot Act,
enacted in the wake of 9/11,
832
00:45:02,658 --> 00:45:04,242
was a law that allowed the government
833
00:45:04,326 --> 00:45:07,537
very broad powers
to get records about people
834
00:45:07,621 --> 00:45:11,916
with a lower level of suspicion than
probable cause, the traditional standard.
835
00:45:12,000 --> 00:45:14,293
So it's always been assumed
that under the Patriot Act,
836
00:45:14,378 --> 00:45:16,254
if the government
had even any suspicion
837
00:45:16,338 --> 00:45:18,423
that you were involved
in a crime or terrorism,
838
00:45:18,507 --> 00:45:20,633
they could get a lot of
information about you.
839
00:45:20,718 --> 00:45:23,553
What this court order does
that makes it so striking,
840
00:45:23,637 --> 00:45:25,930
is that it's not directed
at any individuals
841
00:45:26,014 --> 00:45:29,308
who they believe or have suspicion
of committing crimes
842
00:45:29,393 --> 00:45:30,810
or are part of a terrorist organization,
843
00:45:30,894 --> 00:45:33,896
it's collecting the phone records
of every single customer
844
00:45:33,981 --> 00:45:35,815
of Verizon business
845
00:45:35,899 --> 00:45:39,736
and finding out every single call that
they've made, internationally and locally,
846
00:45:39,820 --> 00:45:41,821
so it's indiscriminate and it's sweeping.
847
00:45:41,905 --> 00:45:44,323
It's a government program
designed to collect information
848
00:45:44,408 --> 00:45:46,451
about all Americans,
not just people
849
00:45:46,535 --> 00:45:49,662
where they believe there's reason
to think they've done anything wrong.
850
00:46:49,556 --> 00:46:51,724
Ah, it's,
it's a tough situation,
851
00:46:51,809 --> 00:46:54,519
you know, hearing that
the person that you love,
852
00:46:54,603 --> 00:46:57,271
that you've spent
the decade with,
853
00:46:57,356 --> 00:46:58,940
may not be coming back.
854
00:47:03,862 --> 00:47:05,905
What did they ask her?
855
00:47:05,989 --> 00:47:09,033
Um, when was the last time
she saw me,
856
00:47:09,117 --> 00:47:12,119
where am I,
um, what am I doing,
857
00:47:12,204 --> 00:47:13,996
you know,
what does she know about
858
00:47:14,081 --> 00:47:16,791
my illness, things like that.
859
00:47:16,875 --> 00:47:17,875
Uh...
860
00:47:19,503 --> 00:47:20,586
so.
861
00:47:20,671 --> 00:47:24,382
Yeah, they're um...
they're pretty solidly aware.
862
00:47:25,467 --> 00:47:26,592
'Cause, uh...
863
00:47:27,636 --> 00:47:30,137
I'm clearly not at home ill.
864
00:47:51,159 --> 00:47:52,702
- Hello?
- Hello?
865
00:47:52,786 --> 00:47:57,123
Hello, let me disconnect
from the Internet.
866
00:47:59,668 --> 00:48:03,588
So, there's some news?
867
00:48:03,672 --> 00:48:06,716
Yes, there was indeed some news.
I have config.
868
00:48:06,800 --> 00:48:10,052
Today, I think,
maybe just a few hours ago?
869
00:48:10,137 --> 00:48:13,472
What...
what kind of people visited?
870
00:48:13,557 --> 00:48:15,099
Uh...
871
00:48:15,183 --> 00:48:17,852
An H.R. lady,
I'm assuming from NSA
872
00:48:17,936 --> 00:48:21,564
as opposed to,
uh, as opposed to Booz Allen,
873
00:48:21,648 --> 00:48:23,441
because she was accompanied
by a police officer,
874
00:48:23,525 --> 00:48:25,109
which means NSA police.
875
00:48:25,193 --> 00:48:26,611
And they were planning
to break into my house,
876
00:48:26,695 --> 00:48:29,030
which regular police don't do.
877
00:48:29,114 --> 00:48:30,323
Does she live there?
878
00:48:30,407 --> 00:48:34,744
Yeah, she lives there.
So I told her to cooperate fully...
879
00:48:34,828 --> 00:48:36,245
I can't find
my phone, just one second...
880
00:48:36,330 --> 00:48:37,371
You know, don't worry about herself.
881
00:48:37,456 --> 00:48:40,374
You know what, I'll just
take out the stuff I wanna use...
882
00:48:40,459 --> 00:48:42,501
Okay.
883
00:48:42,586 --> 00:48:45,504
Okay, well look, I mean,
this is not a surprising development.
884
00:48:45,589 --> 00:48:47,840
Nah, I know, I planned for it,
but it's just, you know,
885
00:48:47,925 --> 00:48:49,592
when it's impacting them
and they're talking to you,
886
00:48:49,676 --> 00:48:50,885
it's a little bit different.
887
00:48:50,969 --> 00:48:51,969
Absolutely.
888
00:48:53,722 --> 00:48:56,974
But it's possible that they just
noticed that you're missing.
889
00:48:57,059 --> 00:48:58,476
I guess
it's not really a possibility.
890
00:48:58,560 --> 00:49:00,728
It is, but they're, I mean...
891
00:49:05,275 --> 00:49:08,611
Um...
Let me just get rid of this.
892
00:49:10,864 --> 00:49:14,241
Sorry, I obviously was focused on
other things than appearance this morning.
893
00:49:16,745 --> 00:49:19,413
How was... How did she react?
Was she relatively calm about it?
894
00:49:19,498 --> 00:49:20,998
She's relatively calm...
895
00:49:21,083 --> 00:49:23,668
Does she know anything about
what you're doing and why?
896
00:49:23,752 --> 00:49:25,795
She has no idea.
897
00:49:25,879 --> 00:49:27,463
And that's, I mean, I...
898
00:49:28,507 --> 00:49:31,550
I feel badly about that, but that's
the only way I could think of where,
899
00:49:31,635 --> 00:49:33,302
like, she can't be in trouble.
900
00:49:33,387 --> 00:49:35,304
Did you just basically do a,
"I have to go somewhere
901
00:49:35,389 --> 00:49:37,473
for reasons that I can't tell you
about" kind of thing, or...?
902
00:49:37,557 --> 00:49:39,934
I just disappeared
when she was on vacation.
903
00:49:40,018 --> 00:49:44,397
Um, and I left a note saying, "Hey, I'm
going to be gone for a while for work,"
904
00:49:44,481 --> 00:49:46,315
which isn't unusual for me
in my business.
905
00:49:46,400 --> 00:49:48,734
- Right.
- You know, so...
906
00:49:48,819 --> 00:49:51,404
Okay, so let me ask you
a couple things just quickly.
907
00:49:51,488 --> 00:49:54,991
Are they gonna be able to go into
your stuff and figure out what you took?
908
00:49:55,075 --> 00:50:00,162
Um, in some kind of...
909
00:50:00,247 --> 00:50:03,833
some sort of, like, peripheral senses,
but not necessarily...
910
00:50:03,917 --> 00:50:05,918
- Not with great specificity.
- Yes.
911
00:50:06,003 --> 00:50:08,546
Because I cast such a wide net.
912
00:50:08,630 --> 00:50:10,840
If they do that the only thing
they're gonna do is have a heart attack
913
00:50:10,924 --> 00:50:12,800
because they're gonna go,
"He had access to everything."
914
00:50:12,884 --> 00:50:14,093
Yeah.
915
00:50:14,177 --> 00:50:17,304
And they're not gonna know
what specifically has been done.
916
00:50:17,389 --> 00:50:20,182
I think they're gonna start to
actually feel a little better,
917
00:50:20,267 --> 00:50:22,810
although
they're not gonna be wild
918
00:50:22,894 --> 00:50:25,521
about this in any case,
when they see that the stories
919
00:50:25,605 --> 00:50:28,315
are kind of cleaving to a trend,
you know, it's not like,
920
00:50:28,400 --> 00:50:30,860
"Here's the list of everybody
who works everywhere."
921
00:50:30,944 --> 00:50:32,069
Right.
922
00:50:32,154 --> 00:50:34,822
I also think, you know, they're gonna
be paranoid in the extreme,
923
00:50:34,906 --> 00:50:38,617
and assuming all kinds of
worst case scenarios,
924
00:50:38,702 --> 00:50:41,370
which is gonna,
you know, I think make them
925
00:50:41,455 --> 00:50:42,872
react in ways
that probably aren't,
926
00:50:42,956 --> 00:50:46,751
like, gonna be particularly
rational on their part.
927
00:50:46,835 --> 00:50:48,878
But, at the same time,
928
00:50:48,962 --> 00:50:51,589
there's... I do think
they're limited for the moment.
929
00:50:51,673 --> 00:50:56,052
I agree, and I mean,
I had kinda time to set a stage
930
00:50:56,136 --> 00:50:58,721
where we all enjoy at least
a minimum level of protection,
931
00:50:58,805 --> 00:51:00,723
you know, no matter who we are,
who's involved in this,
932
00:51:00,807 --> 00:51:03,684
you know, you're either a journalist,
or you're either out of jurisdiction,
933
00:51:03,769 --> 00:51:06,729
so we have some time to play this
before they can really get nasty.
934
00:51:06,813 --> 00:51:08,355
I think it's over, you know, the weeks
when they have times,
935
00:51:08,440 --> 00:51:12,860
to get lawyers really sort of go,
"This is a special situation.
936
00:51:12,944 --> 00:51:14,779
How can we interpret this
to our advantage?"
937
00:51:14,863 --> 00:51:16,781
We... we see them do this
all the time, you know,
938
00:51:16,865 --> 00:51:19,283
whether it's drones
or wiretapping or whatever,
939
00:51:19,367 --> 00:51:22,661
they'll go, "Well according
to this law from the 1840s,
940
00:51:22,746 --> 00:51:25,289
you know,
with X, Y, or Z authority..."
941
00:51:25,373 --> 00:51:27,500
But that takes time.
And that takes agreement...
942
00:51:27,584 --> 00:51:29,418
And also, you know, I mean,
943
00:51:29,503 --> 00:51:32,671
I think the more public we are
out there too, like as journalists,
944
00:51:32,756 --> 00:51:35,508
the more protection
that's gonna give as well.
945
00:51:36,635 --> 00:51:39,887
Have you started to give thought to
when you're ready to come forward?
946
00:51:39,971 --> 00:51:43,307
I'm ready whenever, um...
947
00:51:43,391 --> 00:51:46,185
Honestly, I think
there's sort of an agreement
948
00:51:46,269 --> 00:51:48,938
that it's not going to bias
the reporting process.
949
00:51:49,022 --> 00:51:50,189
That's my primary concern
at this point.
950
00:51:50,273 --> 00:51:52,691
I don't want to get myself
into the issue
951
00:51:52,776 --> 00:51:55,402
before it's gonna happen anyway,
and where it takes away
952
00:51:55,487 --> 00:51:56,904
from the stories
that are getting out.
953
00:52:36,236 --> 00:52:39,155
We're talking about
tens of millions of Americans,
954
00:52:39,239 --> 00:52:41,448
who weren't suspected
of doing anything,
955
00:52:41,533 --> 00:52:43,075
who were surveilled in this way.
956
00:52:43,160 --> 00:52:45,703
Hold your thoughts for a moment.
I want to continue this conversation
957
00:52:45,787 --> 00:52:47,872
because these are really important,
sensitive issues,
958
00:52:47,956 --> 00:52:51,083
and the public out there
has a right to know what's going on.
959
00:52:51,168 --> 00:52:53,586
This is CNN Breaking News.
960
00:52:54,588 --> 00:52:56,881
Another explosive article
has just appeared,
961
00:52:56,965 --> 00:52:58,883
this time in The Washington Post.
962
00:52:58,967 --> 00:53:01,969
It's breaking news
and it reveals another broad
963
00:53:02,053 --> 00:53:04,638
and secret US government
surveillance program.
964
00:53:04,723 --> 00:53:07,224
The Washington Post
and The Guardian in London
965
00:53:07,309 --> 00:53:09,643
reporting that the NSA
and the FBI
966
00:53:09,728 --> 00:53:12,771
are tapping directly
into the central servers
967
00:53:12,856 --> 00:53:15,149
of nine leading
Internet companies,
968
00:53:15,233 --> 00:53:17,985
including Microsoft,
Yahoo, Google, Facebook,
969
00:53:18,069 --> 00:53:20,905
AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.
970
00:53:20,989 --> 00:53:23,157
The Post says
they're extracting audio,
971
00:53:23,241 --> 00:53:26,243
video, photographs,
emails, documents,
972
00:53:26,328 --> 00:53:28,495
and connection logs
that enable analysts
973
00:53:28,580 --> 00:53:32,166
to track a person's movements
and contacts over time.
974
00:53:32,250 --> 00:53:37,004
Let's discuss this latest revelation...
they're coming out fast. Bill Binney,
975
00:53:37,088 --> 00:53:40,257
former official of the NSA
who quit back in 2001,
976
00:53:40,342 --> 00:53:42,176
you were angry over
what was going on,
977
00:53:42,260 --> 00:53:44,345
you are known
as a whistleblower right now.
978
00:53:44,429 --> 00:53:46,639
Bill, what do you think about
this Washington Post story?
979
00:53:46,723 --> 00:53:50,184
Well, I assume it's just a continuation
of what they've been doing all along.
980
00:53:50,268 --> 00:53:51,518
So you're not surprised.
981
00:53:51,603 --> 00:53:53,812
Do you have any idea who is
leaking this information?
982
00:53:53,897 --> 00:53:56,065
I don't know who leaked this.
983
00:53:56,149 --> 00:53:58,150
I have no doubt
that the administration
984
00:53:58,235 --> 00:54:00,402
will launch an investigation,
985
00:54:00,487 --> 00:54:04,323
not into who approved these programs
but into who leaked the information.
986
00:54:04,407 --> 00:54:07,201
I'm not shocked
the companies are denying it,
987
00:54:07,285 --> 00:54:09,453
- I don't assume...
- Do you believe them?
988
00:54:09,537 --> 00:54:11,205
There may be some technical basis
989
00:54:11,289 --> 00:54:14,458
on which they can say that
we are not actively collaborating
990
00:54:14,542 --> 00:54:17,586
or they don't have what we consider
in our own definition
991
00:54:17,671 --> 00:54:19,338
to be direct access to our servers
992
00:54:19,422 --> 00:54:22,341
but what I do know is that I've talked
to more than one person
993
00:54:22,425 --> 00:54:26,345
who has sat at a desk at a web portal
994
00:54:26,429 --> 00:54:31,016
and typed out commands and reached
into those servers from a distance.
995
00:54:31,101 --> 00:54:34,186
So whatever they want to call that,
that's what's happening.
996
00:54:34,271 --> 00:54:36,605
Well, what I would call it
is the single biggest infringement
997
00:54:36,690 --> 00:54:39,608
on American civil liberties
probably of all time, isn't it?
998
00:54:39,693 --> 00:54:41,694
It's interesting, already
you have The New York Times
999
00:54:41,778 --> 00:54:44,446
now today saying that the administration
has lost all credibility.
1000
00:54:44,531 --> 00:54:46,532
The New York Times
slammed President Obama for this,
1001
00:54:46,616 --> 00:54:48,033
and frankly I was used to that.
1002
00:54:48,118 --> 00:54:49,910
The New York Times
used to slam George Bush
1003
00:54:49,995 --> 00:54:51,829
for protecting the country
and for the steps he took.
1004
00:54:51,913 --> 00:54:54,873
I don't want us to drop our guard,
I don't want us to be struck again.
1005
00:54:54,958 --> 00:54:58,127
As we saw in Boston,
Anderson, people are willing
1006
00:54:58,211 --> 00:54:59,628
to sacrifice their civil liberties.
1007
00:54:59,713 --> 00:55:01,088
People sheltered inside...
1008
00:55:01,172 --> 00:55:03,090
How can you believe
in freedom, do you think...
1009
00:55:03,174 --> 00:55:05,009
I mean, try and play
Devil's Advocate for me,
1010
00:55:05,093 --> 00:55:09,096
when you have secret courts,
secret operations like PRISM,
1011
00:55:09,180 --> 00:55:12,057
secret investigations which go
into every spit and cough
1012
00:55:12,142 --> 00:55:13,767
of every American's lives,
1013
00:55:13,852 --> 00:55:15,853
without any member of the American
public knowing about it.
1014
00:55:15,937 --> 00:55:17,396
That's not freedom, is it?
1015
00:55:17,480 --> 00:55:20,649
In 2008, they eliminated
the warrant requirement
1016
00:55:20,734 --> 00:55:23,777
for all conversations
except ones that take place
1017
00:55:23,862 --> 00:55:26,322
by and among Americans
exclusively on American soil.
1018
00:55:26,406 --> 00:55:29,491
So they don't need warrants
now for people
1019
00:55:29,576 --> 00:55:31,160
who are foreigners
outside of the US,
1020
00:55:31,244 --> 00:55:33,996
but they also don't need
warrants for Americans
1021
00:55:34,080 --> 00:55:36,290
who are in the United States
communicating with people
1022
00:55:36,374 --> 00:55:38,667
reasonably believed to be
outside of the US.
1023
00:55:38,752 --> 00:55:41,253
So again, the fact that there are
no checks, no oversight
1024
00:55:41,338 --> 00:55:43,672
about who is looking
over the NSA's shoulder,
1025
00:55:43,757 --> 00:55:45,424
means that they can take
whatever they want.
1026
00:55:45,508 --> 00:55:47,801
And the fact that it's all
behind a wall of secrecy
1027
00:55:47,886 --> 00:55:50,054
and they threaten people
who want to expose it,
1028
00:55:50,138 --> 00:55:53,515
means that whatever they're doing,
even violating the law,
1029
00:55:53,600 --> 00:55:56,727
is something that we're unlikely to know
until we start having real investigations
1030
00:55:56,811 --> 00:56:00,272
and real transparency into
what it is that the government is doing.
1031
00:56:00,357 --> 00:56:04,151
Glenn Greenwald, congratulations again
on exposing what is a true scandal.
1032
00:56:04,235 --> 00:56:05,652
I appreciate you joining me.
1033
00:56:51,825 --> 00:56:55,619
I just heard from Lindsay,
1034
00:56:55,703 --> 00:56:59,581
and uh, she's still alive,
which is good, and free.
1035
00:56:59,666 --> 00:57:02,459
My rent checks
apparently are no longer
1036
00:57:02,544 --> 00:57:04,211
getting through
to my landlord,
1037
00:57:04,295 --> 00:57:06,839
uh, so they said
if we don't pay them
1038
00:57:06,923 --> 00:57:09,716
in five days we'll be evicted,
which is strange
1039
00:57:09,801 --> 00:57:13,220
because I've got a system set
up that automatically pays them.
1040
00:57:14,472 --> 00:57:16,390
Uh, so there's that,
1041
00:57:16,474 --> 00:57:18,392
and apparently
there's construction trucks
1042
00:57:18,476 --> 00:57:21,353
all over the street of my house,
so that's uh...
1043
00:57:24,858 --> 00:57:26,483
I wonder
what they're looking for.
1044
00:58:10,028 --> 00:58:15,657
It is... uh, it is an unusual feeling
that's kind of hard to...
1045
00:58:15,742 --> 00:58:19,453
hard to like describe or...
or convey in words,
1046
00:58:19,537 --> 00:58:21,955
but not knowing what's going to
happen the next day,
1047
00:58:22,040 --> 00:58:25,167
the next hour,
the next week, it's scary,
1048
00:58:25,251 --> 00:58:26,668
but at the same time
it's liberating.
1049
00:58:26,753 --> 00:58:28,837
You know, the, uh...
1050
00:58:28,922 --> 00:58:30,589
the planning comes a lot easier
1051
00:58:30,673 --> 00:58:33,050
because you don't have that many
variables to take into play.
1052
00:58:33,134 --> 00:58:35,761
You can only act
and then act again.
1053
00:58:36,930 --> 00:58:39,473
Now all these phone calls
are being recorded digitally,
1054
00:58:39,557 --> 00:58:42,267
not for content
but for origin and destination,
1055
00:58:42,352 --> 00:58:44,853
now word the government is going
right into the servers
1056
00:58:44,938 --> 00:58:46,522
of these large Internet companies.
1057
00:58:46,606 --> 00:58:49,316
How does the government,
politically speaking,
1058
00:58:49,400 --> 00:58:52,486
make the argument that this is
essential to national security
1059
00:58:52,570 --> 00:58:56,657
and not a dramatic overreach
in terms of personal privacy?
1060
00:58:56,741 --> 00:58:59,493
It's difficult Matt, because,
as Peter was pointing out,
1061
00:58:59,577 --> 00:59:03,497
overnight we had an extraordinary,
late-night... close to midnight...
1062
00:59:03,581 --> 00:59:05,165
announcement and a declassification
1063
00:59:05,250 --> 00:59:07,000
from the Director
of National Intelligence.
1064
00:59:07,085 --> 00:59:08,252
They are scrambling.
1065
00:59:08,336 --> 00:59:11,797
The administration's already supported
strongly by leaders in both parties
1066
00:59:11,881 --> 00:59:13,340
from the intelligence committees.
1067
00:59:13,424 --> 00:59:17,636
GCHQ has an internal Wikipedia,
at the top secret,
1068
00:59:17,720 --> 00:59:19,471
you know, super classified level, uh,
1069
00:59:19,556 --> 00:59:22,307
where anybody working intelligence
can work on anything they want.
1070
00:59:22,392 --> 00:59:23,392
Yep.
1071
00:59:23,476 --> 00:59:25,811
That's what this is, I'm giving it to you,
you can make the decisions on that,
1072
00:59:25,895 --> 00:59:27,312
what's appropriate, what's not.
1073
00:59:27,397 --> 00:59:29,523
It's going to be
documents of different types,
1074
00:59:29,607 --> 00:59:33,235
pictures and PowerPoints,
Word documents, stuff like that.
1075
00:59:33,319 --> 00:59:34,611
- Um...
- Sorry, can I take a seat?
1076
00:59:34,696 --> 00:59:35,696
Yeah.
1077
00:59:38,241 --> 00:59:42,286
Sorry, I get you to repeat,
so in these documents they all show...
1078
00:59:42,370 --> 00:59:44,162
Yeah, there'll be
a couple more documents on that,
1079
00:59:44,247 --> 00:59:45,664
that's only one part though.
1080
00:59:45,748 --> 00:59:48,041
Like, it talks about Tempora
and a little more thing,
1081
00:59:48,126 --> 00:59:50,252
that's the Wiki article itself.
1082
00:59:50,336 --> 00:59:52,796
It was also talking about
a self-developed tool
1083
00:59:52,880 --> 00:59:56,049
called UDAQ, U-D-A-Q.
1084
00:59:56,134 --> 00:59:58,552
It's their search tool
for all the stuff they collect,
1085
00:59:58,636 --> 01:00:00,262
was what it looked like.
1086
01:00:00,346 --> 01:00:01,555
It's going to be projects,
1087
01:00:01,639 --> 01:00:05,017
it's going to be troubleshooting pages
for a particular tool...
1088
01:00:05,101 --> 01:00:06,101
Thanks.
1089
01:00:06,185 --> 01:00:08,562
Um... what's the next step?
1090
01:00:08,646 --> 01:00:10,439
When do you think
you'll go public?
1091
01:00:10,523 --> 01:00:13,942
Ah, I think it's pretty soon,
I mean with the reaction,
1092
01:00:14,027 --> 01:00:15,277
this escalated more quickly.
1093
01:00:15,361 --> 01:00:18,655
I think pretty much as soon as they start
trying to make this about me,
1094
01:00:18,740 --> 01:00:20,574
which should be any day now.
1095
01:00:20,658 --> 01:00:22,075
Yep.
1096
01:00:22,160 --> 01:00:23,577
I'll come out just to go,
1097
01:00:23,661 --> 01:00:29,458
"Hey, this is not a question of somebody
skulking around in the shadows."
1098
01:00:29,542 --> 01:00:32,044
These are public issues,
these are not my issues,
1099
01:00:32,128 --> 01:00:34,338
you know,
these are everybody's issues.
1100
01:00:34,422 --> 01:00:35,922
And I'm not afraid of you, you know.
1101
01:00:36,007 --> 01:00:40,218
You're not going to bully me into silence
like you've done to everybody else.
1102
01:00:40,303 --> 01:00:42,512
And if nobody else is gonna do it, I will,
1103
01:00:42,597 --> 01:00:45,307
and hopefully when I'm gone,
whatever you do to me,
1104
01:00:45,391 --> 01:00:47,476
there will be somebody else
who'll do the same thing.
1105
01:00:47,560 --> 01:00:50,729
It'll be the sort of Internet
principle of the hydra.
1106
01:00:50,813 --> 01:00:54,232
You know, you can stomp one person,
but there's gonna be seven more of us.
1107
01:00:54,317 --> 01:00:56,026
Yeah.
1108
01:00:58,571 --> 01:00:59,988
Are you getting more nervous?
1109
01:01:00,073 --> 01:01:04,868
Um... I mean, no.
1110
01:01:04,952 --> 01:01:06,495
I think, uh...
1111
01:01:06,579 --> 01:01:09,081
I think the way
I look at stress,
1112
01:01:09,165 --> 01:01:12,000
particularly because I sort of
knew this was coming,
1113
01:01:12,085 --> 01:01:14,878
you know,
because I sort of volunteered
1114
01:01:14,962 --> 01:01:17,172
to walk into it, um...
1115
01:01:19,300 --> 01:01:23,136
I'm already sort of familiar
with the idea.
1116
01:01:23,221 --> 01:01:24,638
I'm not worried about it.
1117
01:01:24,722 --> 01:01:26,848
When somebody, like,
busts in the door?
1118
01:01:26,933 --> 01:01:28,517
Suddenly I'll get nervous,
and it'll affect me,
1119
01:01:28,601 --> 01:01:31,853
but until they do...
I don't know, you know.
1120
01:01:31,938 --> 01:01:36,358
I'm eating a little less,
that's the only difference, I think.
1121
01:01:41,989 --> 01:01:44,032
Let's talk about the issue with,
1122
01:01:44,117 --> 01:01:45,701
when we're gonna say
who you are.
1123
01:01:45,785 --> 01:01:47,411
Yeah.
1124
01:01:47,495 --> 01:01:50,414
This is, you know, you have to
talk me through this.
1125
01:01:50,498 --> 01:01:52,165
Because I have a big worry
about this.
1126
01:01:52,250 --> 01:01:53,250
Okay, tell me.
1127
01:01:53,334 --> 01:01:57,087
Which is that,
if we come out and...
1128
01:01:58,256 --> 01:02:01,633
I know that you believe
that your detection
1129
01:02:01,718 --> 01:02:04,678
is inevitable and that
it's inevitable imminently.
1130
01:02:04,762 --> 01:02:06,596
There's, you know,
in the New York Times today,
1131
01:02:06,681 --> 01:02:11,059
Charlie Savage, the fascinating
Sherlock Holmes of political reporting,
1132
01:02:11,144 --> 01:02:13,812
deduced that the fact that there's
been these leaks in succession
1133
01:02:13,896 --> 01:02:16,565
probably means that there's some
one person who decided to leak...
1134
01:02:16,649 --> 01:02:19,443
Somebody else quoted you
as saying it was one of your readers,
1135
01:02:19,527 --> 01:02:21,194
and somebody else
put another thing,
1136
01:02:21,279 --> 01:02:23,697
So, you know, it's fine.
I want people...
1137
01:02:23,781 --> 01:02:27,576
I want it to be like,
you know, like, this is a person...
1138
01:02:27,660 --> 01:02:30,287
I want to start introducing the concept
that this is a person
1139
01:02:30,371 --> 01:02:33,373
who has a particular set
of political objectives
1140
01:02:33,458 --> 01:02:35,917
about informing the world
about what's taking place.
1141
01:02:36,002 --> 01:02:39,045
So I'm keeping it all
anonymous, totally,
1142
01:02:39,130 --> 01:02:41,381
but I want to start
introducing you
1143
01:02:41,466 --> 01:02:43,300
in that kind of incremental way.
1144
01:02:43,384 --> 01:02:45,343
But... here's the thing.
1145
01:02:45,428 --> 01:02:48,388
What I'm concerned is that
if we come out and say,
1146
01:02:48,473 --> 01:02:50,140
"Here's who this is,
here's what he did,"
1147
01:02:50,224 --> 01:02:51,808
the whole thing
that we talked about,
1148
01:02:51,893 --> 01:02:54,060
that we're gonna basically be doing
the government's work for them.
1149
01:02:54,145 --> 01:02:56,563
And we're basically
going to be handing them,
1150
01:02:56,647 --> 01:02:59,274
you know, a confession,
1151
01:02:59,358 --> 01:03:01,526
and helping them
identify who found it.
1152
01:03:01,611 --> 01:03:02,819
Maybe you're right,
1153
01:03:02,904 --> 01:03:05,572
maybe they'll find out quickly,
and maybe they'll know,
1154
01:03:05,656 --> 01:03:07,449
but is there any possibility
that they won't?
1155
01:03:07,533 --> 01:03:12,412
Are we kind of giving them
stuff that we don't... or, or...
1156
01:03:12,497 --> 01:03:13,663
The possibility that they know
1157
01:03:13,748 --> 01:03:15,415
but they don't want to reveal it
because they don't know.
1158
01:03:15,500 --> 01:03:18,043
Or that they don't know and we're
going to be telling them, like...
1159
01:03:18,127 --> 01:03:21,421
Is it a possibility that they're going
to need two, three months of uncertainty,
1160
01:03:21,506 --> 01:03:23,715
and we're going to be
solving that problem for them?
1161
01:03:23,800 --> 01:03:27,427
Or, let me just say, the or part,
maybe it doesn't matter to you,
1162
01:03:27,512 --> 01:03:30,472
maybe...
1163
01:03:30,556 --> 01:03:33,683
You're not coming out
because you think inevitably
1164
01:03:33,768 --> 01:03:36,353
they're going to catch you,
and you want to do it first,
1165
01:03:36,437 --> 01:03:38,438
you're coming out because
you want to fucking come out.
1166
01:03:38,523 --> 01:03:39,940
- And you wanna be heard.
- Well, there is that.
1167
01:03:40,024 --> 01:03:42,317
I mean that's the thing,
I don't want to hide on this
1168
01:03:42,401 --> 01:03:44,736
and skulk around,
I don't think I should have to.
1169
01:03:44,821 --> 01:03:47,322
Um, obviously there are circumstances
that are saying that,
1170
01:03:47,406 --> 01:03:50,116
and I think it is powerful
to come out and be like,
1171
01:03:50,201 --> 01:03:52,369
look, I'm not afraid, you know,
1172
01:03:52,453 --> 01:03:54,120
and I don't think
other people should either.
1173
01:03:54,205 --> 01:03:57,207
I was sitting in the office
right next to you last week.
1174
01:03:57,291 --> 01:04:00,001
You know, we all have a stake in this.
This is our country.
1175
01:04:00,086 --> 01:04:04,089
And the balance of power between
the citizenry and the government
1176
01:04:04,173 --> 01:04:06,967
is becoming that of the ruling
and the ruled
1177
01:04:07,051 --> 01:04:10,470
as opposed to actually, you know,
the elected and the electorate.
1178
01:04:10,555 --> 01:04:12,389
Okay,
so that's what I needed to hear,
1179
01:04:12,473 --> 01:04:15,225
that this is not about...
1180
01:04:15,309 --> 01:04:17,018
But I do want to say:
1181
01:04:17,103 --> 01:04:20,230
I don't think there's a case
that I'm not going to be discovered
1182
01:04:20,314 --> 01:04:23,233
in the fullness of time,
it's a question of time frame.
1183
01:04:23,317 --> 01:04:25,735
You're right, it could take them
a long time. I don't think it will.
1184
01:04:25,820 --> 01:04:28,405
But I didn't try to hide
the footprint because again,
1185
01:04:28,489 --> 01:04:30,323
I intended to come forward
the whole time.
1186
01:04:30,408 --> 01:04:34,202
I'm going to post this morning just
a general defense of whistleblowers...
1187
01:04:34,287 --> 01:04:35,704
That's fine, yeah.
1188
01:04:35,788 --> 01:04:38,081
...and you in particular without
saying anything about you.
1189
01:04:38,165 --> 01:04:39,332
I'm gonna go post that
right when I get back.
1190
01:04:39,417 --> 01:04:41,877
And I'm also doing like
a big fuck-you to all the people
1191
01:04:41,961 --> 01:04:43,879
who keep, like,
talking about investigations.
1192
01:04:43,963 --> 01:04:45,297
I want that to be...
1193
01:04:46,299 --> 01:04:48,258
The fearlessness
and the fuck-you to,
1194
01:04:48,342 --> 01:04:50,719
like, the bullying tactics
has gotta be
1195
01:04:50,803 --> 01:04:52,888
completely pervading
everything we do.
1196
01:04:52,972 --> 01:04:54,890
And I think that's brilliant.
1197
01:04:54,974 --> 01:04:58,393
Your principles on this I love,
I can't support them enough.
1198
01:04:58,477 --> 01:05:02,606
Because it's inverting the model
that the government has laid out,
1199
01:05:02,690 --> 01:05:04,858
where people who are trying to,
you know, say the truth
1200
01:05:04,942 --> 01:05:06,401
skulk around
and they hide in the dark
1201
01:05:06,485 --> 01:05:07,986
and they quote anonymously
and whatnot...
1202
01:05:08,070 --> 01:05:09,154
I say yes, fuck that, let's just...
1203
01:05:09,238 --> 01:05:11,489
Okay, so here's the plan then.
1204
01:05:11,574 --> 01:05:13,491
And this is the thing.
1205
01:05:14,619 --> 01:05:16,286
I think
we just all felt the fact
1206
01:05:16,370 --> 01:05:18,663
that this is the right way
to do it.
1207
01:05:18,748 --> 01:05:21,750
You feel the power of your
choice, you know what I mean?
1208
01:05:21,834 --> 01:05:24,377
I want that power
to be felt in the world.
1209
01:05:24,462 --> 01:05:26,004
And it is...
1210
01:05:26,088 --> 01:05:27,797
it's the ultimate standing
up to them.
1211
01:05:27,882 --> 01:05:30,508
Right, like,
"I'm not gonna fucking hide,
1212
01:05:30,593 --> 01:05:32,177
even for like one second,
1213
01:05:32,261 --> 01:05:34,137
I'm gonna get right
in your face.
1214
01:05:34,221 --> 01:05:35,639
You don't have to investigate,
1215
01:05:35,723 --> 01:05:37,807
there's nothing to investigate,
here I am."
1216
01:05:37,892 --> 01:05:38,934
- Yeah.
- You know?
1217
01:05:39,018 --> 01:05:41,811
And I just think that is
just incredibly powerful.
1218
01:05:41,896 --> 01:05:44,272
And then the question
just becomes
1219
01:05:44,357 --> 01:05:45,774
how do we do this
in the right...
1220
01:05:45,858 --> 01:05:47,692
you know, the perfect way,
and that's my burden.
1221
01:05:47,777 --> 01:05:49,152
And that's what I'm gonna...
1222
01:05:49,236 --> 01:05:52,030
So today is gonna be
the story in the morning,
1223
01:05:52,114 --> 01:05:54,282
assuming that it doesn't change
with The Guardian,
1224
01:05:54,367 --> 01:05:55,367
it's gonna be the story
in the morning,
1225
01:05:55,451 --> 01:05:58,954
just to keep the momentum going,
just to keep the disclosures coming,
1226
01:05:59,038 --> 01:06:00,455
a big one at night.
1227
01:06:00,539 --> 01:06:05,543
Now it's becoming, like, okay,
this is a major leak, and after today,
1228
01:06:05,628 --> 01:06:07,837
when we post the two things
that we're gonna post,
1229
01:06:07,922 --> 01:06:11,299
it's gonna be,
"What the fuck is this leak,
1230
01:06:11,384 --> 01:06:13,218
and who did it,"
I guarantee you.
1231
01:06:23,521 --> 01:06:25,981
I just want to make sure...
move over slightly.
1232
01:06:26,065 --> 01:06:27,941
Do you want me to move
a little more over, or, okay.
1233
01:06:28,025 --> 01:06:29,526
I just wanna... all right.
1234
01:06:32,196 --> 01:06:33,697
All right, we're rolling.
1235
01:06:33,781 --> 01:06:36,574
So let's just begin with
some basic background information,
1236
01:06:36,659 --> 01:06:38,743
like, just state your name,
1237
01:06:38,828 --> 01:06:40,745
what position you held
in the intelligence community,
1238
01:06:40,830 --> 01:06:44,124
and... and how long you
worked within that community.
1239
01:06:44,208 --> 01:06:46,751
Okay, um, just so I'm aware of
where we're going,
1240
01:06:46,836 --> 01:06:48,878
how in depth are we going,
just in general,
1241
01:06:48,963 --> 01:06:50,839
like 'I'm currently
an infrastructure analyst
1242
01:06:50,923 --> 01:06:52,841
you know, Booz Allen Hamilton,
1243
01:06:52,925 --> 01:06:54,509
not going through
my whole back story...'
1244
01:06:54,593 --> 01:06:55,593
- Yeah.
- Okay.
1245
01:06:55,678 --> 01:06:57,012
Just like,
yeah, summary kind of...
1246
01:06:57,096 --> 01:06:58,138
Okay.
1247
01:06:58,222 --> 01:07:01,099
Uh, My name's Ed Snowden,
I'm, uh, 29 years old,
1248
01:07:01,183 --> 01:07:03,768
I work for Booz Allen Hamilton
1249
01:07:03,853 --> 01:07:07,605
as an infrastructure analyst
for NSA, uh, in Hawaii.
1250
01:07:08,607 --> 01:07:10,025
And what are
some of the positions
1251
01:07:10,109 --> 01:07:12,777
that you held previously within
the intelligence community?
1252
01:07:12,862 --> 01:07:16,614
Uh, I've been, uh, a systems engineer,
systems administrator,
1253
01:07:16,699 --> 01:07:21,911
uh, senior advisor, uh, for the, uh,
1254
01:07:21,996 --> 01:07:23,413
Central Intelligence Agency,
1255
01:07:23,497 --> 01:07:25,999
solutions consultant and a, uh,
1256
01:07:26,083 --> 01:07:29,044
telecommunications informations
systems officer.
1257
01:07:29,128 --> 01:07:31,796
And what kind of
clearances have...
1258
01:07:31,881 --> 01:07:33,631
have you held,
what kind of classification?
1259
01:07:33,716 --> 01:07:37,260
Uh, Top Secret, uh...
Hm...
1260
01:07:40,014 --> 01:07:43,266
So people in my levels of access
for systems administration
1261
01:07:43,350 --> 01:07:45,935
or as a...
a infrastructure analyst,
1262
01:07:46,020 --> 01:07:48,521
typically have,
uh, higher accesses
1263
01:07:48,606 --> 01:07:51,900
than an NSA employee
would normally have.
1264
01:07:51,984 --> 01:07:55,070
Normal NSA employees have
a combination of clearances
1265
01:07:55,154 --> 01:07:59,449
called TS, SI, TK, and Gamma.
1266
01:07:59,533 --> 01:08:01,910
Um, that's Top Secret,
1267
01:08:01,994 --> 01:08:05,455
uh, Signals Intelligence,
Talent Keyhole, and Gamma.
1268
01:08:05,539 --> 01:08:07,457
And they all,
uh, relate to certain things
1269
01:08:07,541 --> 01:08:10,210
that are sort of core
to the NSA mission.
1270
01:08:10,294 --> 01:08:12,462
As a systems administrator,
1271
01:08:12,546 --> 01:08:14,589
you get a special clearance
called PRIVAC,
1272
01:08:14,673 --> 01:08:16,299
for Privileged Access,
1273
01:08:16,383 --> 01:08:18,176
which allows you to be exposed
1274
01:08:18,260 --> 01:08:20,345
to information
of any classification,
1275
01:08:20,429 --> 01:08:23,389
regardless of what your position
actually needs.
1276
01:08:58,342 --> 01:09:00,635
Just before we go,
a reminder of our top story,
1277
01:09:00,719 --> 01:09:03,263
that's that
the former CIA technical worker
1278
01:09:03,347 --> 01:09:07,142
Edward Snowden says he's responsible
for leaking information
1279
01:09:07,226 --> 01:09:12,021
that US authorities had been
monitoring phone and Internet data.
1280
01:09:12,106 --> 01:09:13,773
The US Justice Department confirmed
1281
01:09:13,858 --> 01:09:17,152
it's in the first stages
of a criminal investigation.
1282
01:09:17,236 --> 01:09:19,737
Leave it longer or cut it shorter,
what do you think?
1283
01:09:19,822 --> 01:09:22,031
As far as the video
that people saw?
1284
01:09:22,116 --> 01:09:24,742
Am I less identifiable now?
Lose it?
1285
01:09:24,827 --> 01:09:27,287
Cause I can't go all the way down.
It's still gonna be stubble.
1286
01:09:27,371 --> 01:09:29,581
I don't have the blade
for closer.
1287
01:09:32,126 --> 01:09:35,545
Will you be talking
to any other media about this story today?
1288
01:09:35,629 --> 01:09:37,505
I am.
1289
01:09:37,590 --> 01:09:39,257
Will you be coming to our
office at Associated Press?
1290
01:09:39,341 --> 01:09:42,510
We'd be interested to ask about where
is Snowden now, what his plans are.
1291
01:09:42,595 --> 01:09:44,762
I'm not going to talk about that,
so unless you have other questions,
1292
01:09:44,847 --> 01:09:46,264
it's gonna be a fruitless interview.
1293
01:09:46,348 --> 01:09:47,891
What are your plans, please?
1294
01:09:47,975 --> 01:09:49,684
Are you staying in Hong Kong
for the time being?
1295
01:09:49,768 --> 01:09:51,102
For a little while.
1296
01:09:51,187 --> 01:09:54,063
And do you have any hopes
to write more about this story,
1297
01:09:54,148 --> 01:09:55,982
or are you stopping
new writing about this story?
1298
01:09:56,066 --> 01:09:57,609
No, I'm gonna continue
to write about it.
1299
01:09:58,777 --> 01:10:00,528
Have you had any pressure
from the US authorities
1300
01:10:00,613 --> 01:10:03,072
- about continuing to report on this?
- No.
1301
01:10:03,157 --> 01:10:06,701
And have you heard anything
about what could be the attitude
1302
01:10:06,785 --> 01:10:08,703
of Hong Kong authorities
towards this case,
1303
01:10:08,787 --> 01:10:11,581
whether they've contacted you
or asked you anything about
1304
01:10:11,665 --> 01:10:14,667
the whereabouts of Snowden
and whether that is another...
1305
01:10:14,752 --> 01:10:17,503
I haven't heard from the authorities
of any government.
1306
01:10:18,923 --> 01:10:22,217
And where do you think
the story is going, for you
1307
01:10:22,301 --> 01:10:25,470
and of course for Snowden,
and of course for the US media
1308
01:10:25,554 --> 01:10:27,222
and the US administration
in general?
1309
01:10:27,306 --> 01:10:29,849
Well, for me I can tell, I'm
gonna continue to report on...
1310
01:10:29,934 --> 01:10:32,185
do my reporting on what
the government has been doing
1311
01:10:32,269 --> 01:10:34,437
and what I think my readers
should know about.
1312
01:10:34,521 --> 01:10:36,522
Um, as for him, I don't...
I don't think anyone knows.
1313
01:10:36,607 --> 01:10:38,399
They could have
people come after me
1314
01:10:38,484 --> 01:10:40,860
or any of their third-party partners.
1315
01:10:40,945 --> 01:10:43,821
You know, they work closely
with a number of other nations.
1316
01:10:43,906 --> 01:10:45,990
Or, you know,
they could pay off the triads.
1317
01:10:46,075 --> 01:10:48,368
You know,
any of their agents or assets,
1318
01:10:48,452 --> 01:10:51,120
uh... we have a CIA station
just up the road,
1319
01:10:51,205 --> 01:10:53,831
at the consulate here in Hong Kong.
1320
01:11:19,233 --> 01:11:22,360
Hello, I'm
Daniela Ritorto. the top story this hour:
1321
01:11:22,444 --> 01:11:26,114
facing a criminal investigation,
the whistleblower who revealed details
1322
01:11:26,198 --> 01:11:31,494
on how the US is monitoring phone
calls and Internet data goes public.
1323
01:11:31,578 --> 01:11:35,373
Security forces in Afghanistan
say a number of Taliban insurgents
1324
01:11:35,457 --> 01:11:38,167
have targeted Kabul's airport.
1325
01:11:38,252 --> 01:11:40,420
Now it's time
for our newspaper review
1326
01:11:40,504 --> 01:11:43,172
and looking at what's making
headlines around the world.
1327
01:11:43,257 --> 01:11:45,174
Let's start with The Guardian,
our top story,
1328
01:11:45,259 --> 01:11:49,429
which is revealing the identity
of the former CIA employee
1329
01:11:49,513 --> 01:11:51,306
who the paper says leaked information
1330
01:11:51,390 --> 01:11:56,102
exposing the scale of American
surveillance of the Internet.
1331
01:11:56,186 --> 01:11:57,312
Edward Snowden.
1332
01:11:57,396 --> 01:11:58,521
What a great story.
1333
01:11:58,605 --> 01:11:59,689
Kira, Ewen, what do you think?
1334
01:11:59,773 --> 01:12:01,274
Well,
I think it's a fantastic story...
1335
01:12:01,358 --> 01:12:03,943
first off, it could be straight
out of a John Le Carre novel.
1336
01:12:04,028 --> 01:12:06,404
I mean, when you read what he did,
yes, he got the material.
1337
01:12:06,488 --> 01:12:08,740
He then decided to go
to the place he identified
1338
01:12:08,824 --> 01:12:10,366
as being very difficult
for America to get at him...
1339
01:12:10,451 --> 01:12:11,451
God damn it.
1340
01:12:11,535 --> 01:12:15,413
...which is Hong Kong, because,
of course, technically inside China,
1341
01:12:15,497 --> 01:12:18,082
the one country,
two systems policy there,
1342
01:12:18,167 --> 01:12:21,794
meaning he would get potentially
some protection abroad.
1343
01:12:21,879 --> 01:12:24,714
All very well-planned. It could have
been just out of a spy novel.
1344
01:12:24,798 --> 01:12:26,132
But what about the details?
1345
01:12:30,054 --> 01:12:32,305
Well, that could make it worse,
but...
1346
01:12:36,060 --> 01:12:39,145
I don't know, only shows
the lower half of my face.
1347
01:13:12,679 --> 01:13:15,223
Snowden says
he'd become increasingly dismayed
1348
01:13:15,307 --> 01:13:18,643
by what he saw as
the growing power of the NSA,
1349
01:13:18,727 --> 01:13:21,020
hence his decision
to pass on documents
1350
01:13:21,105 --> 01:13:24,107
which are said to reveal
not only that the organization
1351
01:13:24,191 --> 01:13:26,401
monitored millions of phone calls,
1352
01:13:26,485 --> 01:13:28,778
but that it had direct access
to some of the biggest...
1353
01:13:28,862 --> 01:13:29,862
How do you feel?
1354
01:13:31,156 --> 01:13:33,282
Um...
1355
01:13:33,367 --> 01:13:36,285
what happens, happens.
We've, uh, we've talked about this.
1356
01:13:36,370 --> 01:13:38,788
I knew what the risks were.
1357
01:13:38,872 --> 01:13:40,873
If I get arrested, I get arrested.
1358
01:13:40,958 --> 01:13:41,999
Um...
1359
01:13:43,001 --> 01:13:47,505
We were able to get the information,
uh, that needed to get out, out.
1360
01:13:48,882 --> 01:13:52,635
And you and Glenn
are able to keep reporting,
1361
01:13:52,719 --> 01:13:54,762
regardless
of what happens to me.
1362
01:13:56,140 --> 01:13:59,308
Now what 29-year-old
Edward Snowden said that US...
1363
01:14:04,898 --> 01:14:07,191
The Guardian newspaper
reveals his identity...
1364
01:14:07,276 --> 01:14:08,901
Yes?
1365
01:14:08,986 --> 01:14:10,570
...from Washington,
David Willis has this.
1366
01:14:10,654 --> 01:14:12,780
Uh, I'm sorry, who's asking?
1367
01:14:15,159 --> 01:14:16,701
Uh, I'm afraid
you have the wrong room.
1368
01:14:16,785 --> 01:14:19,036
Thank you.
1369
01:14:19,121 --> 01:14:20,538
Wall Street Journal.
1370
01:14:31,884 --> 01:14:34,552
Yes?
1371
01:14:36,054 --> 01:14:37,805
Uh, I'm sorry, say again?
1372
01:14:40,058 --> 01:14:42,351
Uh, no. No thank you.
No calls.
1373
01:14:42,436 --> 01:14:44,020
I think they have
the wrong number.
1374
01:14:45,314 --> 01:14:48,566
Yeah, no calls. Thank you.
Uh, wait, I'm sorry.
1375
01:14:48,650 --> 01:14:52,111
If it's uh, if it's two men
from the front desk,
1376
01:14:52,196 --> 01:14:53,863
they can call,
but no outside calls...
1377
01:14:53,947 --> 01:14:55,907
Wait, actually,
just let them through.
1378
01:14:58,035 --> 01:15:00,077
Wait, wait, ma'am?
Fuck!
1379
01:15:05,334 --> 01:15:07,168
Yes?
1380
01:15:12,174 --> 01:15:14,467
Uh, wait, is it...
is it a lawyer?
1381
01:15:16,678 --> 01:15:19,096
Yeah, no, no, no, I mean
the people who are asking,
1382
01:15:19,181 --> 01:15:21,182
ask them if they are lawyers.
1383
01:15:27,189 --> 01:15:30,399
Uh, no. Tell her that, uh,
she has the wrong number
1384
01:15:30,484 --> 01:15:32,693
and there's no Mr. Snowden here.
1385
01:15:40,744 --> 01:15:43,412
Hi, Robert, can you talk right now?
1386
01:15:43,497 --> 01:15:46,207
I safely got into the room.
1387
01:15:46,291 --> 01:15:49,126
I'm now safely with the client, okay?
1388
01:15:49,211 --> 01:15:52,755
So, can we talk together
about the plan?
1389
01:15:52,839 --> 01:15:56,717
Did this application start already
or what? Technically?
1390
01:15:59,513 --> 01:16:00,930
Yeah, but...
1391
01:16:01,014 --> 01:16:03,224
So technically it hasn't started yet.
1392
01:16:13,151 --> 01:16:15,778
Would you mind to talk
in speakerphone?
1393
01:16:16,947 --> 01:16:18,114
Sorry.
1394
01:16:18,198 --> 01:16:19,365
Hey, Robert.
1395
01:16:19,449 --> 01:16:20,950
Yeah, hi.
1396
01:16:21,034 --> 01:16:22,535
Hi, I'm the client.
1397
01:16:23,537 --> 01:16:25,454
Hi, Edward,
how are you holding up?
1398
01:16:25,539 --> 01:16:28,291
Uh, pretty good. I'm doing well.
1399
01:16:28,375 --> 01:16:33,713
Okay, I just met with the head
of the UNHCR here in Hong Kong,
1400
01:16:33,797 --> 01:16:37,300
and they are aware
that you are raising
1401
01:16:37,384 --> 01:16:40,970
the protection you are entitled to
under the UNHCR and
1402
01:16:41,054 --> 01:16:43,180
and they would like you
to come in with us to the UN.
1403
01:16:43,265 --> 01:16:44,599
Okay.
1404
01:16:45,183 --> 01:16:47,310
If you come now, it's lunchtime,
1405
01:16:47,394 --> 01:16:50,187
but they're gonna let us in.
No one else can get in.
1406
01:16:50,272 --> 01:16:51,731
Okay.
1407
01:16:51,815 --> 01:16:54,817
At the UNHCR there are
separate exits from the building
1408
01:16:54,901 --> 01:16:56,277
so we have a good opportunity,
1409
01:16:56,361 --> 01:16:58,696
if any of the media
finds out you're there...
1410
01:16:58,780 --> 01:16:59,780
Yeah.
1411
01:16:59,865 --> 01:17:01,907
...you'll be able to exit
a different way from the building.
1412
01:17:01,992 --> 01:17:04,702
Okay, that's great.
Is it okay if I bring equipment?
1413
01:17:04,786 --> 01:17:06,329
'Cause I'm just kind of going
1414
01:17:06,413 --> 01:17:08,247
so I can leave in any direction
at any time
1415
01:17:08,332 --> 01:17:10,583
and not come back, if necessary.
1416
01:17:10,667 --> 01:17:13,127
Just walk out of there.
You don't have to go back.
1417
01:17:13,211 --> 01:17:14,211
Okay.
1418
01:17:14,296 --> 01:17:16,714
Take whatever you want with you,
and just go with Mr. Man.
1419
01:17:16,798 --> 01:17:19,425
I will pick you... he knows where
I'm gonna pick you guys up,
1420
01:17:19,509 --> 01:17:20,968
and then I'll bring you
to the UNHCR.
1421
01:17:21,053 --> 01:17:22,470
Okay, that sounds good.
1422
01:17:23,472 --> 01:17:25,139
Thank you, uh, thank you
so much for helping me.
1423
01:17:25,223 --> 01:17:28,309
He's quite worried
about the next step,
1424
01:17:28,393 --> 01:17:30,728
about accommodation,
where he is going to stay,
1425
01:17:30,812 --> 01:17:35,483
whether there is something private and
he would not be discovered by the police.
1426
01:17:35,567 --> 01:17:38,694
Don't worry about that now.
Let's just get him to the UN.
1427
01:17:38,779 --> 01:17:39,779
Okay, I see.
1428
01:17:39,863 --> 01:17:43,240
Okay, I will give you a call
before we start, okay?
1429
01:17:43,325 --> 01:17:44,325
- Okay, thank you.
- Okay, thank you.
1430
01:17:44,409 --> 01:17:45,493
- Bye-bye.
- Bye.
1431
01:17:46,662 --> 01:17:48,245
So...
1432
01:17:48,747 --> 01:17:50,623
We don't have a car.
1433
01:17:50,707 --> 01:17:51,707
Okay.
1434
01:17:51,792 --> 01:17:53,709
What I'm thinking...
1435
01:17:53,794 --> 01:17:58,464
we may ask the concierge
to arrange a car,
1436
01:17:58,548 --> 01:18:00,800
or we just go down
and catch a taxi.
1437
01:18:00,884 --> 01:18:02,343
But it's quite...
1438
01:18:02,427 --> 01:18:06,681
The traffic here in Tsim Sha Tsui
is quite difficult to get a taxi.
1439
01:18:06,765 --> 01:18:07,848
Yeah...
1440
01:18:07,933 --> 01:18:10,309
And so is there
a precedent for this,
1441
01:18:10,394 --> 01:18:14,105
where Hong Kong would extradite
someone for political speech?
1442
01:18:14,189 --> 01:18:16,190
No, I'm not aware of.
1443
01:18:16,274 --> 01:18:18,275
But if we have a torture claim
1444
01:18:18,360 --> 01:18:20,111
or asylum-seeking claim,
1445
01:18:20,195 --> 01:18:22,279
then they ought, under the law,
1446
01:18:22,364 --> 01:18:24,824
they ought to give you recognizance
1447
01:18:24,908 --> 01:18:26,450
for you to stay in Hong Kong
1448
01:18:26,535 --> 01:18:30,746
because they don't know
where to dump you back yet.
1449
01:19:21,715 --> 01:19:23,549
The president certainly
does not welcome the way
1450
01:19:23,633 --> 01:19:26,010
that this debate has earned
greater attention in the last week,
1451
01:19:26,094 --> 01:19:29,138
the leak of classified information
about sensitive programs
1452
01:19:29,222 --> 01:19:31,390
that are important in our fight
against terrorists
1453
01:19:31,475 --> 01:19:34,769
who would do harm to Americans,
is a problem.
1454
01:19:34,853 --> 01:19:38,397
But the debate itself is legitimate
and should be engaged.
1455
01:21:25,630 --> 01:21:30,676
"The US Spied on Millions of
Brazilian Emails and Phone Calls"
1456
01:21:31,887 --> 01:21:35,264
I'd like to show you
the new document now.
1457
01:21:35,348 --> 01:21:38,642
You'll see it much more clearly.
1458
01:21:38,727 --> 01:21:45,107
This map shows the cables they use
to collect the data for PRISM.
1459
01:21:45,191 --> 01:21:49,111
Here it shows how much
they are collecting.
1460
01:21:49,195 --> 01:21:53,282
The thicker the line,
the more they're collecting.
1461
01:21:53,366 --> 01:21:55,492
You can see these lines,
1462
01:21:55,577 --> 01:22:00,456
the cables, are quite thick
in the south of Brazil
1463
01:22:00,540 --> 01:22:03,000
and up north in the Sea of Brazil.
1464
01:22:03,084 --> 01:22:06,045
So they're collecting a lot
through the PRISM program,
1465
01:22:06,129 --> 01:22:09,632
which I think is very important
because PRISM is Facebook,
1466
01:22:09,716 --> 01:22:12,801
Skype, YouTube, Yahoo, Hotmail.
1467
01:22:12,886 --> 01:22:15,763
And it shows a lot
is being stolen from Brazil.
1468
01:22:16,514 --> 01:22:21,018
But we don't know how much
the Brazilian government knows,
1469
01:22:21,102 --> 01:22:26,065
or whether it's collaborating
with Brazilian companies.
1470
01:22:26,149 --> 01:22:28,233
But we're going to know, I believe.
1471
01:22:28,318 --> 01:22:30,736
One day we will know everything.
Or almost everything.
1472
01:22:30,820 --> 01:22:31,820
Yes.
1473
01:23:29,921 --> 01:23:32,131
All right, so which ones
do we want here, then?
1474
01:23:32,215 --> 01:23:35,009
This is operational stuff,
so we mustn't say any of this...
1475
01:23:35,093 --> 01:23:36,301
So redact that.
1476
01:23:36,386 --> 01:23:38,012
Go... go to top.
1477
01:23:38,096 --> 01:23:39,513
What about
the Alexander quote?
1478
01:23:39,597 --> 01:23:41,015
Yeah, that's in TARMAC.
1479
01:23:41,099 --> 01:23:44,393
"Why can't we collect
all the signals all the time?
1480
01:23:44,477 --> 01:23:47,438
Sounds like a good summer
homework project for Menwith."
1481
01:23:47,522 --> 01:23:50,649
Keith Alexander, the head of the NSA,
on a visit to UK.
1482
01:23:50,734 --> 01:23:52,609
- This one.
- Yeah.
1483
01:23:52,694 --> 01:23:55,446
Secret document, isn't it?
Secret document.
1484
01:23:55,530 --> 01:23:59,867
We've got a stick here that should
just have three single slides on them.
1485
01:23:59,951 --> 01:24:03,871
If it's got more than three single slides,
we have to be extremely careful.
1486
01:24:06,499 --> 01:24:08,167
- Yeah?
- Yeah, that's it.
1487
01:24:08,251 --> 01:24:12,129
This is really dangerous
stuff for us, The Guardian, isn't it?
1488
01:24:12,213 --> 01:24:15,049
You make mistakes and at the very end
where we kept it all under lock and key...
1489
01:24:15,133 --> 01:24:17,634
And no one knows.
I'm not saying that...
1490
01:24:18,762 --> 01:24:20,929
They will come in and smack
the front door down if we...
1491
01:24:21,014 --> 01:24:22,389
if we elaborate on that.
1492
01:24:23,475 --> 01:24:26,810
He said the Prime Minister's
extremely concerned about this.
1493
01:24:26,895 --> 01:24:29,646
And they kept saying,
"This is from the very top."
1494
01:25:40,176 --> 01:25:41,718
As you can see on this map,
1495
01:25:41,803 --> 01:25:43,554
the flight that reportedly
has Snowden aboard
1496
01:25:43,638 --> 01:25:46,014
has almost reached
its destination here in Moscow,
1497
01:25:46,099 --> 01:25:48,892
scheduled to land in the
Russian capital within minutes.
1498
01:25:48,977 --> 01:25:54,731
As you may have heard,
there is a CIA Agent
1499
01:25:54,816 --> 01:25:57,276
who has revealed a lot of information,
1500
01:25:57,360 --> 01:26:01,989
and he is now trapped in the,
um, the airport in Moscow.
1501
01:26:02,073 --> 01:26:04,324
We managed to get him
out of Hong Kong,
1502
01:26:04,409 --> 01:26:06,994
but when he landed
in the Moscow airport,
1503
01:26:07,078 --> 01:26:10,956
the American government
had canceled his passport.
1504
01:26:11,040 --> 01:26:14,084
So, formally, he hasn't
entered into Russian territory.
1505
01:26:14,169 --> 01:26:17,087
He is in the transit area
of the airport,
1506
01:26:17,172 --> 01:26:20,424
and one of our people
is accompanying him.
1507
01:26:20,508 --> 01:26:26,680
We are trying to arrange
a private jet to, um
1508
01:26:26,764 --> 01:26:32,060
take him from Moscow to Ecuador
1509
01:26:32,145 --> 01:26:37,566
or perhaps maybe Venezuela
or maybe Iceland,
1510
01:26:37,650 --> 01:26:39,359
countries where he will be safe.
1511
01:26:52,999 --> 01:26:55,542
The floor is yours,
for the time that you deem necessary.
1512
01:26:55,627 --> 01:26:58,629
Thank you and hello.
1513
01:26:58,713 --> 01:27:04,176
First of all, Americans' justification
for everything
1514
01:27:04,260 --> 01:27:07,971
since the September 11 attacks
is terrorism.
1515
01:27:08,056 --> 01:27:10,224
Everything is in the name
of national security,
1516
01:27:10,308 --> 01:27:12,184
to protect our population.
1517
01:27:12,268 --> 01:27:18,023
In reality, it's the opposite.
A lot of the documents
1518
01:27:18,107 --> 01:27:24,655
have nothing to do with
terrorism or national security,
1519
01:27:24,739 --> 01:27:27,574
but with competition between countries,
1520
01:27:27,659 --> 01:27:32,621
and with companies' industrial,
financial, or economic issues.
1521
01:27:32,705 --> 01:27:35,958
Secondly, there's XKeyscore.
1522
01:27:36,042 --> 01:27:40,879
When we first started publishing articles,
1523
01:27:40,964 --> 01:27:42,965
the US government's defense
1524
01:27:43,049 --> 01:27:47,094
was that it was not invading
the content of communications,
1525
01:27:47,178 --> 01:27:48,804
just taking the metadata.
1526
01:27:48,888 --> 01:27:54,184
That means the names
of the people talking,
1527
01:27:54,269 --> 01:27:58,146
who is calling whom, call durations.
1528
01:27:58,231 --> 01:28:03,110
But if I know all the people
you are communicating with,
1529
01:28:03,194 --> 01:28:06,280
and everyone
they are communicating with,
1530
01:28:06,364 --> 01:28:09,157
where you are
when you are communicating,
1531
01:28:09,242 --> 01:28:11,576
the call duration and the location,
1532
01:28:11,661 --> 01:28:14,871
then I can learn a lot
about your personality,
1533
01:28:14,956 --> 01:28:17,165
your activity, and your life.
1534
01:28:17,250 --> 01:28:20,836
This is a major invasion of privacy.
1535
01:28:20,920 --> 01:28:24,381
In reality, that defense is totally false.
1536
01:28:24,465 --> 01:28:29,594
The US government has the ability
to get not only metadata,
1537
01:28:29,679 --> 01:28:36,310
but the actual content of your emails
or what you say on the phone,
1538
01:28:36,394 --> 01:28:41,815
the words you type into Google searches,
1539
01:28:41,899 --> 01:28:45,569
the websites you visit,
1540
01:28:45,653 --> 01:28:49,614
the documents you send to colleagues.
1541
01:28:49,699 --> 01:28:57,456
This system can track nearly everything
that every individual is doing online.
1542
01:28:57,540 --> 01:29:02,836
So if you're a journalist investigating
the American government,
1543
01:29:02,920 --> 01:29:08,633
if you work for a company
with American competitors,
1544
01:29:08,718 --> 01:29:14,389
or if you work in human rights
involving the American government,
1545
01:29:14,474 --> 01:29:16,725
or any other field,
1546
01:29:16,809 --> 01:29:21,563
they can very easily
intercept your communication.
1547
01:29:21,647 --> 01:29:24,983
If you're an American living in the US,
1548
01:29:25,068 --> 01:29:28,362
they have to seek permission
from a court,
1549
01:29:28,446 --> 01:29:30,072
but they always get it.
1550
01:29:30,156 --> 01:29:34,326
But if you're not American,
they don't need anything,
1551
01:29:34,410 --> 01:29:37,871
no special permission at all.
1552
01:29:37,955 --> 01:29:44,378
I think the consequences of eliminating
privacy are difficult to predict,
1553
01:29:44,462 --> 01:29:49,674
but we must understand that this
will have an enormous impact.
1554
01:29:49,759 --> 01:29:53,345
The population's ability
to have demonstrations
1555
01:29:53,429 --> 01:30:01,770
or to organize is greatly reduced
when people don't have privacy.
1556
01:30:09,278 --> 01:30:11,863
May I collect all phones, please?
1557
01:30:15,535 --> 01:30:16,660
Okay.
1558
01:30:20,039 --> 01:30:21,373
I have everything here, so...
1559
01:30:24,293 --> 01:30:25,752
Put them in the refrigerator.
1560
01:30:29,799 --> 01:30:30,924
So...
1561
01:30:36,931 --> 01:30:40,183
So as you know, in June,
1562
01:30:40,268 --> 01:30:45,188
Snowden was charged
with three legal violations,
1563
01:30:45,273 --> 01:30:50,610
felonies, principally under
a World War I-era criminal law
1564
01:30:50,695 --> 01:30:52,195
called the Espionage Act.
1565
01:30:53,448 --> 01:30:56,825
The Espionage Act
is an extremely broad criminal
1566
01:30:56,909 --> 01:31:00,871
prohibition against the sharing
or dissemination
1567
01:31:00,955 --> 01:31:02,956
of what's called
national defense information.
1568
01:31:03,040 --> 01:31:07,169
It was only used to,
uh, prosecute people
1569
01:31:07,253 --> 01:31:10,255
who had been accused of acting
with a foreign power.
1570
01:31:10,339 --> 01:31:11,756
Spies, not whistleblowers.
1571
01:31:11,841 --> 01:31:14,926
And it's a very unusual
legal representation, I think,
1572
01:31:15,011 --> 01:31:17,637
not just for all of you
but for me as well.
1573
01:31:18,806 --> 01:31:22,184
The Espionage Act does not
distinguish between leaks
1574
01:31:22,268 --> 01:31:24,436
to the press in the public interest
1575
01:31:24,520 --> 01:31:26,521
and selling secrets
to foreign enemies
1576
01:31:26,606 --> 01:31:28,106
for personal profit.
1577
01:31:28,191 --> 01:31:31,902
So under the Espionage Act,
it's not a defense
1578
01:31:31,986 --> 01:31:35,280
if the information that was
disclosed should not have been
1579
01:31:35,364 --> 01:31:37,949
withheld in the first place,
that it was improperly classified,
1580
01:31:38,034 --> 01:31:40,827
it's not a defense
if the dissemination
1581
01:31:40,912 --> 01:31:42,996
was in the public interest,
that it led to reforms,
1582
01:31:43,080 --> 01:31:46,583
um, even if a court determines
that the programs
1583
01:31:46,667 --> 01:31:49,211
that were revealed were illegal
or unconstitutional,
1584
01:31:49,295 --> 01:31:51,796
that's still not a defense
under the Espionage Act,
1585
01:31:51,881 --> 01:31:54,841
the government doesn't have
to defend the classification,
1586
01:31:54,926 --> 01:31:58,178
it doesn't have to demonstrate
harm from the release,
1587
01:31:58,262 --> 01:32:00,138
um, all of this is irrelevant.
1588
01:32:00,223 --> 01:32:03,099
So when we say
that the trial wouldn't be fair,
1589
01:32:03,184 --> 01:32:06,561
we're not talking about
what human rights lawyers
1590
01:32:06,646 --> 01:32:08,230
think
of as fair trial practices.
1591
01:32:08,314 --> 01:32:10,190
We're saying the law,
the statute itself...
1592
01:32:11,817 --> 01:32:14,361
eliminates
any kind of defense that Snowden
1593
01:32:14,445 --> 01:32:15,862
might be able to make,
1594
01:32:15,947 --> 01:32:18,615
and essentially would equate him
with a spy.
1595
01:32:18,699 --> 01:32:21,493
And of course those
three counts could be increased
1596
01:32:21,577 --> 01:32:23,620
to a hundred or two hundred
or three hundred.
1597
01:32:23,704 --> 01:32:25,622
They could charge him separately
for each document
1598
01:32:25,706 --> 01:32:28,875
that has been published
by a journalist.
1599
01:32:28,960 --> 01:32:31,378
And I think that...
that we all recognize,
1600
01:32:31,462 --> 01:32:34,339
even though we sit here
as lawyers in a lawyer's meeting,
1601
01:32:34,423 --> 01:32:37,968
that it's probably
95 percent politics
1602
01:32:38,052 --> 01:32:41,930
and five percent law
how this will be resolved.
1603
01:33:13,921 --> 01:33:16,881
Mr. Snowden has been charged
with very serious crimes,
1604
01:33:16,966 --> 01:33:19,426
and he should be returned
to the United States
1605
01:33:19,510 --> 01:33:21,177
where he will be granted
full due process
1606
01:33:21,262 --> 01:33:24,973
and every right available to him
as a United States citizen...
1607
01:33:26,309 --> 01:33:28,560
facing our justice system
under the Constitution.
1608
01:34:19,945 --> 01:34:22,113
No, I don't think
Mr. Snowden was a patriot.
1609
01:34:22,198 --> 01:34:28,161
I called for a thorough review
of our surveillance operations
1610
01:34:28,245 --> 01:34:30,205
before Mr. Snowden made these leaks.
1611
01:34:31,540 --> 01:34:36,503
My preference, and I think the
American peoples' preference,
1612
01:34:36,587 --> 01:34:39,381
would have been for a lawful,
1613
01:34:39,465 --> 01:34:42,509
orderly examination
of these laws.
1614
01:34:42,593 --> 01:34:48,098
A thoughtful, fact-based debate,
1615
01:34:48,182 --> 01:34:51,726
uh, that would then lead us
to a better place.
1616
01:35:29,265 --> 01:35:32,392
Oh, my God. David.
1617
01:35:34,645 --> 01:35:37,188
Hello, my baby, how you doing?
1618
01:35:37,273 --> 01:35:38,606
- I'm okay.
- You okay?
1619
01:35:38,691 --> 01:35:39,899
Let's go.
1620
01:35:43,738 --> 01:35:44,904
I just want to go home.
1621
01:35:44,989 --> 01:35:47,282
Okay, okay,
you just have to walk.
1622
01:35:55,166 --> 01:35:56,249
How are you?
1623
01:35:56,333 --> 01:35:58,460
Good, I'm totally fine,
I didn't sleep at all,
1624
01:35:58,544 --> 01:35:59,669
- I couldn't sleep.
- I know.
1625
01:35:59,754 --> 01:36:04,591
"Brazil Demands Explanation
from UK Government"
1626
01:36:22,318 --> 01:36:24,611
Recent reports
have revealed that the NSA
1627
01:36:24,695 --> 01:36:26,863
have access to encryption keys
1628
01:36:26,947 --> 01:36:28,364
and they paid tech companies
1629
01:36:28,449 --> 01:36:30,867
to introduce back doors
in encryption protocols.
1630
01:36:30,951 --> 01:36:32,702
So we're going to talk about
1631
01:36:32,787 --> 01:36:35,246
ways in which we can
defend ourselves
1632
01:36:35,331 --> 01:36:38,208
against
governments spying on us.
1633
01:36:38,292 --> 01:36:40,627
So Mr. Jacob Applebaum
is an encryption
1634
01:36:40,711 --> 01:36:43,213
and security software developer
and journalist.
1635
01:36:43,297 --> 01:36:47,592
Ladar Levinson is the founder
of the encrypted email service
1636
01:36:47,676 --> 01:36:49,886
Lavabit, used by Edward Snowden.
1637
01:36:49,970 --> 01:36:51,387
You have the floor.
1638
01:36:51,472 --> 01:36:52,597
Thank you.
1639
01:36:52,681 --> 01:36:55,892
Lavabit is an email service
that hopefully one day will be able
1640
01:36:55,976 --> 01:37:00,271
to stand on its own without
any references to Snowden.
1641
01:37:00,356 --> 01:37:03,817
My service
was designed to remove me
1642
01:37:03,901 --> 01:37:09,239
from the possibility of being
forced to violate a person's privacy.
1643
01:37:09,323 --> 01:37:12,534
Quite simply,
Lavabit was designed to remove
1644
01:37:12,618 --> 01:37:14,577
the service provider
from the equation.
1645
01:37:14,662 --> 01:37:18,623
By not having logs on my server
and not having access
1646
01:37:18,707 --> 01:37:21,042
to a person's emails on disk,
1647
01:37:21,126 --> 01:37:24,128
I wasn't eliminating
the possibility of surveillance,
1648
01:37:24,213 --> 01:37:28,049
I was simply removing myself
from that equation.
1649
01:37:28,133 --> 01:37:31,886
In that surveillance would have
to be conducted on the target,
1650
01:37:31,971 --> 01:37:34,681
either the sender
or the receiver of the messages.
1651
01:37:34,765 --> 01:37:39,018
But I was approached by the FBI
quite recently
1652
01:37:39,103 --> 01:37:43,022
and told that because I couldn't
turn over the information
1653
01:37:43,107 --> 01:37:45,149
from that one particular user,
1654
01:37:45,234 --> 01:37:47,527
I would be forced to give up
those SSL keys
1655
01:37:47,611 --> 01:37:49,654
and let the FBI collect
every communication
1656
01:37:49,738 --> 01:37:52,657
on my network without
any kind of transparency.
1657
01:37:52,741 --> 01:37:54,617
And of course...
1658
01:37:55,995 --> 01:37:59,581
I wasn't comfortable with that,
to say the least.
1659
01:37:59,665 --> 01:38:01,332
More disturbing was the fact that
1660
01:38:01,417 --> 01:38:03,626
I couldn't even tell anybody
that it was going on.
1661
01:38:04,795 --> 01:38:09,215
So I decided if I didn't win
the fight to unseal my case,
1662
01:38:09,300 --> 01:38:11,926
if I didn't win the battle
to be able to tell people
1663
01:38:12,011 --> 01:38:14,012
what was going on,
1664
01:38:14,096 --> 01:38:17,015
then my only ethical choice left
was to shut down.
1665
01:38:19,768 --> 01:38:20,977
Think about that.
1666
01:38:22,688 --> 01:38:24,105
I believe in the rule of law,
1667
01:38:24,189 --> 01:38:27,108
I believe in the need
to conduct investigations.
1668
01:38:28,152 --> 01:38:31,529
But those investigations are
supposed to be difficult for a reason.
1669
01:38:31,614 --> 01:38:36,034
It's supposed to be difficult
to invade somebody's privacy.
1670
01:38:36,118 --> 01:38:37,869
Because of how intrusive it is.
1671
01:38:38,871 --> 01:38:40,413
Because of how disruptive it is.
1672
01:38:41,790 --> 01:38:44,334
If we can't... if we don't
have our right to privacy,
1673
01:38:44,418 --> 01:38:46,419
how do we have a free
and open discussion?
1674
01:38:47,546 --> 01:38:49,756
What good is the right
to free speech...
1675
01:38:52,509 --> 01:38:53,801
if it's not protected...
1676
01:38:55,179 --> 01:38:57,472
in the sense that you can't have
a private discussion
1677
01:38:57,556 --> 01:39:00,016
with somebody else about
something you disagree with.
1678
01:39:01,060 --> 01:39:03,353
Think about the chilling effect
that that has.
1679
01:39:03,437 --> 01:39:05,438
Think about
the chilling effect it does have
1680
01:39:05,522 --> 01:39:08,733
on countries that don't have
a right to privacy.
1681
01:39:08,817 --> 01:39:11,194
I've noticed
a really interesting discussion point.
1682
01:39:11,278 --> 01:39:13,571
Which is that what people used
to call liberty and freedom,
1683
01:39:13,656 --> 01:39:15,073
we now call privacy.
1684
01:39:16,450 --> 01:39:19,577
And we say, in the same breath,
that privacy is dead.
1685
01:39:20,829 --> 01:39:23,873
This is something that really
concerns me about my generation.
1686
01:39:23,958 --> 01:39:26,584
Especially when we talk about
how we're not surprised by anything.
1687
01:39:26,669 --> 01:39:28,378
I think that we should
consider that
1688
01:39:28,462 --> 01:39:32,131
when we lose privacy,
we lose agency, we lose liberty itself.
1689
01:39:32,216 --> 01:39:34,550
Because we no longer feel
free to express what we think.
1690
01:39:34,635 --> 01:39:37,637
There's this myth of the passive
surveillance machine.
1691
01:39:37,721 --> 01:39:40,598
But actually what is
surveillance, except control?
1692
01:39:40,683 --> 01:39:43,559
This notion that the NSA
are passive, this is nonsense.
1693
01:39:43,644 --> 01:39:46,604
What we see is that they actively
attack European citizens,
1694
01:39:46,689 --> 01:39:49,399
American citizens, and in fact,
anyone that they can
1695
01:39:49,483 --> 01:39:51,109
if they perceive an advantage.
1696
01:40:06,208 --> 01:40:09,585
And then there's the key
paragraph that says
1697
01:40:09,670 --> 01:40:13,339
it was the SCS that intercepted
1698
01:40:13,424 --> 01:40:16,801
Chancellor Merkel's mobile phone.
1699
01:40:16,885 --> 01:40:18,344
We have the number.
1700
01:41:31,460 --> 01:41:34,087
What will you tell the German people?
1701
01:41:35,130 --> 01:41:36,839
I'll have to
give that in testimony.
1702
01:41:36,924 --> 01:41:39,550
What are you
going to tell?
1703
01:41:39,635 --> 01:41:41,052
Everything I can, truthfully.
1704
01:41:43,430 --> 01:41:45,640
What will you talk about?
1705
01:41:45,724 --> 01:41:47,141
Whatever the questions they ask me.
1706
01:41:48,143 --> 01:41:49,352
Yeah, I think it's over there.
1707
01:41:49,436 --> 01:41:52,355
Okay, all right.
Thank you.
1708
01:41:56,944 --> 01:41:58,111
Hello, Mr. Binney.
1709
01:41:58,195 --> 01:42:01,739
Hey, how are you? How are you?
Good to see you again.
1710
01:42:01,824 --> 01:42:03,032
Nice to meet you again, yes.
1711
01:42:13,627 --> 01:42:17,213
It is my pleasure to be here.
I feel that it's important to testify
1712
01:42:17,297 --> 01:42:19,715
about what's really going on
behind the scenes
1713
01:42:19,800 --> 01:42:22,760
in the intelligence communities
around the world.
1714
01:42:22,845 --> 01:42:24,846
Not just in NSA.
1715
01:42:24,930 --> 01:42:27,431
All those programs that
Edward Snowden has exposed
1716
01:42:27,516 --> 01:42:31,435
fundamentally are ways
of acquiring information.
1717
01:42:31,520 --> 01:42:34,647
Every dictatorship down through
history has always done that.
1718
01:42:34,731 --> 01:42:36,524
One of the first things they need to do
1719
01:42:36,608 --> 01:42:39,443
is try to acquire knowledge
of their population.
1720
01:42:39,528 --> 01:42:42,238
And that's exactly
what these programs do.
1721
01:42:42,322 --> 01:42:46,325
I see this as the most major threat
to our democracies all around the world.
1722
01:43:35,250 --> 01:43:37,585
What do you think
they're doing to reporters,
1723
01:43:37,669 --> 01:43:39,212
those of us
that are working directly
1724
01:43:39,296 --> 01:43:41,589
with the Snowden documents?
1725
01:43:41,673 --> 01:43:44,717
How do you think they would approach
dealing with people like us?
1726
01:43:44,801 --> 01:43:46,636
You're on the cast iron
cover list.
1727
01:43:47,804 --> 01:43:51,182
Which means any...
any electronic device you use
1728
01:43:51,266 --> 01:43:55,019
that they can attach to you they'll record
and capture all that data.
1729
01:43:55,103 --> 01:43:58,231
And what do they do with that data?
Trying to figure out what we're doing?
1730
01:43:58,315 --> 01:44:00,566
Uh, well, that's part of it,
1731
01:44:00,651 --> 01:44:03,236
but the other part
for them I think
1732
01:44:03,320 --> 01:44:05,321
is to find the sources
of information you're getting.
1733
01:44:05,405 --> 01:44:07,198
So if I have a confidential source
1734
01:44:07,282 --> 01:44:09,700
who's giving me information
as a whistleblower,
1735
01:44:09,785 --> 01:44:11,369
and he works
within the US government,
1736
01:44:11,453 --> 01:44:13,329
and he's concerned about
1737
01:44:13,413 --> 01:44:16,749
what he perceives as violations
of the Constitution,
1738
01:44:16,833 --> 01:44:20,628
and he gets in touch with me,
they... go ahead.
1739
01:44:20,712 --> 01:44:24,131
From there on, they would nail him
and start watching everything he did,
1740
01:44:24,216 --> 01:44:27,051
and if he started passing data,
I'm sure they'd take him off the street.
1741
01:44:28,345 --> 01:44:31,889
I mean, the way you'd have to do
it is like Deep Throat did, right?
1742
01:44:31,974 --> 01:44:33,391
In the Nixon years.
1743
01:44:33,475 --> 01:44:37,520
Meet in the basement
of a parking garage, physically.
1744
01:45:17,644 --> 01:45:20,313
"Let's disassociate
our metadata one last time...
1745
01:45:20,397 --> 01:45:22,773
so we don't have a record
of your true name
1746
01:45:22,858 --> 01:45:25,192
in our final communication chain.
1747
01:45:25,277 --> 01:45:28,321
This is obviously not to say
you can't claim your involvement,
1748
01:45:28,405 --> 01:45:32,116
but as every trick in the book
is likely to be used in looking into this,
1749
01:45:32,200 --> 01:45:34,368
I believe it's better that
that particular disclosure
1750
01:45:34,453 --> 01:45:35,870
come on your own terms.
1751
01:45:37,664 --> 01:45:39,790
Thank you again for all you've done.
1752
01:45:39,875 --> 01:45:41,959
So sorry again for the multiple delays,
1753
01:45:42,044 --> 01:45:45,296
but we've been in uncharted territory
with no model to benefit from.
1754
01:45:47,049 --> 01:45:50,968
If all ends well, perhaps
the demonstration that our methods worked
1755
01:45:51,053 --> 01:45:52,887
will embolden more to come forward.
1756
01:45:53,930 --> 01:45:55,056
Citizen."
1757
01:46:00,103 --> 01:46:02,104
So the update
that I wanna give you
1758
01:46:02,189 --> 01:46:04,899
is about the new, um...
1759
01:46:06,568 --> 01:46:08,569
the new source that we...
1760
01:46:09,571 --> 01:46:10,946
Okay.
1761
01:46:11,031 --> 01:46:13,949
That...
This is what...
1762
01:46:17,079 --> 01:46:19,246
This is the person
who's doing the most...
1763
01:46:19,331 --> 01:46:20,873
Mm-hmm, right.
1764
01:46:20,957 --> 01:46:22,458
...the work on it, um...
1765
01:46:24,294 --> 01:46:27,338
And now,
basically what's happened is...
1766
01:46:30,759 --> 01:46:31,759
And...
1767
01:46:31,843 --> 01:46:34,845
That's actually...
that's really dangerous.
1768
01:46:34,930 --> 01:46:38,265
Um... on the source's side.
1769
01:46:38,350 --> 01:46:39,975
Do they know how to
take care of themselves?
1770
01:46:40,060 --> 01:46:43,938
I mean he...
it's all being done...
1771
01:46:46,316 --> 01:46:47,525
through this.
1772
01:46:47,609 --> 01:46:48,859
Okay.
1773
01:46:48,944 --> 01:46:50,361
And they're all talking...
1774
01:46:51,405 --> 01:46:52,613
this way.
1775
01:46:52,697 --> 01:46:54,115
Okay.
1776
01:46:54,199 --> 01:46:56,784
I was gonna say,
one of the big questions there is,
1777
01:46:56,868 --> 01:46:58,536
can they handle it?
1778
01:46:58,620 --> 01:47:00,663
No, they're very careful.
1779
01:47:00,747 --> 01:47:02,623
- Even... through that. Yeah.
- Okay.
1780
01:47:07,879 --> 01:47:09,088
And...
1781
01:47:16,513 --> 01:47:17,721
That's where that is.
1782
01:47:20,016 --> 01:47:21,767
Wow,
that's really something.
1783
01:47:34,489 --> 01:47:36,115
Did you know that?
1784
01:47:42,372 --> 01:47:44,457
It's not the actual planes.
1785
01:47:44,541 --> 01:47:47,084
Right, right,
you mean the control.
1786
01:47:47,169 --> 01:47:49,879
It's the process,
who's sending the... yeah.
1787
01:47:49,963 --> 01:47:52,465
There's a chart.
1788
01:47:52,549 --> 01:47:55,301
There's like a whole layout
for every one...
1789
01:47:55,385 --> 01:47:57,970
That is really bold;
it's really risky.
1790
01:47:58,054 --> 01:48:00,473
You know, that's the thing,
if they understand what they're doing...
1791
01:48:00,557 --> 01:48:03,058
There's this chart,
it goes like this.
1792
01:48:03,143 --> 01:48:05,561
It shows
the decision-making chart.
1793
01:48:05,645 --> 01:48:07,438
It's shaped like this:
1794
01:48:13,820 --> 01:48:15,988
- So up here it says...
- Mm-hmm.
1795
01:48:16,072 --> 01:48:19,700
That's the decision-making chart
for each... one.
1796
01:48:24,789 --> 01:48:28,042
- It's so political!
- This is this part's amazing.
1797
01:48:35,091 --> 01:48:38,135
- That's...
- That's fucking ridiculous.
1798
01:48:38,220 --> 01:48:39,845
This is...
It's so shocking.
1799
01:48:46,061 --> 01:48:49,563
That's... that's the
population of entire countries.
1800
01:48:53,360 --> 01:48:55,611
That's what we're working on.
1801
01:49:09,918 --> 01:49:11,335
That person
is incredibly bold.
1802
01:49:11,419 --> 01:49:12,628
But, um...
1803
01:49:12,712 --> 01:49:15,464
But also very well aware.
1804
01:49:15,549 --> 01:49:17,800
You know, I just hope...
I mean...
1805
01:49:17,884 --> 01:49:20,010
No, I mean,
the boldness of it is shocking,
1806
01:49:20,095 --> 01:49:23,138
but it was obviously
motivated by what you did,
1807
01:49:23,223 --> 01:49:25,349
- I mean...
- This is going to.
1808
01:49:25,433 --> 01:49:29,353
This is going to
That could raise the profile...
1809
01:49:30,438 --> 01:49:31,897
of this
whole political situation
1810
01:49:31,982 --> 01:49:34,233
with whistleblowing
to a whole new level.
1811
01:49:34,317 --> 01:49:36,402
- Exactly.
- It's gonna...
1812
01:49:36,486 --> 01:49:39,238
Yeah,
I actually think that's a great thing.
1813
01:49:39,322 --> 01:49:42,658
And I think people are gonna see
what's being hidden again,
1814
01:49:42,742 --> 01:49:46,078
again, by a totally different
part of the government.